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I. INTRODUCTION 
Had someone told you, on September 11, 2001, that the United 
States would not be able to do whatever it wanted in response to the 
terrorist attacks of that day, you might well have questioned their sanity. 
The United States was the most powerful country in the world, and had 
the world’s sympathy in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. Who 
would stop it? Al Qaeda had few friends beyond the Taliban. As a 
historical matter, Congress and the courts had virtually always deferred 
to the executive in such times of crisis. And the American polity was 
unlikely to object to measures that sacrificed the rights of others—Arabs 
and Muslims, and especially Arab and Muslim foreigners—for 
Americans’ security.  
Yet perhaps the most important and surprising lesson of the past 
decade is that constitutional and human rights, which seemed so 
vulnerable in the attacks’ aftermath, proved far more resilient than many 
would have predicted. President George W. Bush’s administration 
initially chafed at the constraints of constitutional, statutory, and 
international law, which it treated as inconvenient obstacles on the path 
to security.1
Equally surprising is that these restraints for the most part were 
imposed not by the formal mechanisms of checks and balances, but by 
more informal influences, often sparked by efforts of civil society 
organizations that advocated, educated, organized, demonstrated, and 
litigated for constitutional and human rights. The American 
constitutional system is traditionally understood to rely on the separation 
of powers and judicial review to protect liberty and impose legal 
restrictions on government officials. After September 11, however, as in 
 The administration acted as if no one would dare to—or 
could effectively—check it. But in time, the executive branch of the most 
powerful nation in the world was compelled to adapt its response to legal 
demands. 
  
 1. See, e.g., JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON 
TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2008) (recounting the internal 
decisions to bypass legal constraints in the wake of 9/11); DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, 
LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERRORISM 23-101 (2007) 
(cataloguing the Bush administration’s lawless measures in the wake of 9/11); Richard 
Falk, The Abandonment of International Law After 9/11, Presentation to the 
Congressional Black Caucus Annual Legislative Conference (Sept. 21-24, 2005), 
available at http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2005/09/21_falk_abandonment-
international-law.htm. 
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other periods of crisis in American history, all three branches were often 
compromised in their commitments to liberty, equality, dignity, fair 
process, and the “rule of law.”2 By contrast, civil society groups 
dedicated to constitutional and rule-of-law values, such as the American 
Civil Liberties Union, the Center for Constitutional Rights, the American 
Bar Association, Human Rights Watch, Human Rights First, the Bill of 
Rights Defense Committee, the Constitution Project, the Muslim Public 
Affairs Council, and the Council on American Islamic Relations, 
consistently defended constitutional and human rights—and in so doing 
reinforced the checking function of constitutional and international law. 
They issued reports identifying and condemning lawless ventures;3 
provided material and sources to the media to help spread the word;4 
filed lawsuits in domestic and international fora challenging allegedly 
illegal initiatives;5 organized and educated the public about the 
importance of adhering to constitutional and human rights 
commitments;6 testified in Congressional hearings on torture, illegal 
surveillance, and Guantánamo;7 and coordinated with foreign 
governments and international nongovernmental organizations to bring 
diplomatic pressure to bear on the United States to conform its actions to 
constitutional and international law.8
Scholars have long focused on the role constitutions and the formal 
structures of government that they create play in reinforcing 
commitments to long-term principles when ordinary political forces are 
  
  
 2. In referring to the “rule of law,” I mean not merely the Fullerian sense of 
transparency and procedural regularity, see LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964), 
but the more colloquial modern-day sense of that term, which is often used as short-hand 
to encompass commitments to liberty, equality, privacy, dignity, and the separation of 
powers. I will also refer to these as “constitutional and human rights” as I mean to refer 
not only to domestic constitutional law but to international human rights and 
humanitarian law, and to statutory restrictions that further such rights (such as the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice and the criminal torture and war crimes statutes).  
 3. See, e.g., Presumption of Guilt: Human Rights Abuses of September 11 Detainees, 
14.4(G) HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2002), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/us911/USA0802.pdf [hereinafter Presumption of Guilt]. 
 4. Id.  
 5. ACLU in the Courts Since 9/11, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Oct. 12, 2006), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/since911docket_20061013.pdf.  
 6. See generally, Presumption of Guilt, supra note 3. 
 7. See, e.g., Testimony of Washington Legislative Office Director, Caroline 
Fredrickson, At A Democratic Hearing to Investigate NSA Wiretapping Program (Jan. 
20, 2006), available at testimony-washington-legislative-office-director-caroline-
fredrickson-democratic-h. 
 8. See infra notes 131-145 and accompanying text. 
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inclined to seek shortcuts.9
These organizations’ interventions often call on the formal structures 
of government to heed their legal claims, but the post-9/11 experience 
suggests that their work can have traction beyond the formal confines of 
judicial opinions and enacted statutes. In the first decade after September 
11, civil society appears to have played at least as critical a role in the 
restoration of constitutional and human rights values as the formal 
institutions of government. In this period, the constraints on executive 
power operated through what I will call “civil society constitutionalism,” 
in which nongovernmental organizations advocated in multiple ways for 
adherence to the rule of law, in court and out, and in so doing, did much 
of the “work” of constitutionalism. 
 The United States’ experience during the 
decade following September 11 suggests that this focus is incomplete; 
we should pay at least as much attention to the work civil society groups 
do to “enforce” constitutional rights. Much like a constitution itself, such 
groups stand for, and can shore up, commitments to principle when those 
commitments are most tested. And while we often speak metaphorically 
about a “living Constitution,” civil society groups are actually living 
embodiments of these commitments, comprised of human beings who 
have joined together out of a shared, lived dedication to constitutional 
and human rights principles. As such, they are well positioned to 
influence the polity’s and the government’s reactions in real time, and in 
crisis periods may be the only institutional counterforce to the impulse to 
sacrifice rights for security.  
In examining the nexus between civil society and constitutionalism, I 
am especially interested in those nongovernmental groups that define 
themselves by their collective commitment to constitutional or rule-of-
law values. “Civil society” can mean many things to many people, but I 
will use it in this essay principally as shorthand for this particular subset 
of nongovernmental organizations. Ernest Gellner provisionally defined 
the broader civil society as “a set of diverse non-governmental 
institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and, while 
not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and 
arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent it from 
dominating and atomizing the rest of society.”10
  
 9. See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1986); JOHN 
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Doni Gerwirtzman, Our Founding 
Feelings: Emotion, Commitment, And Imagination in Constitutional Culture, 43 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 623, 623-24 (2009). 
 The broader civil 
society, including such institutions as the New York Times, Fox News, 
 10. ERNEST GELLNER, THE CONDITIONS OF LIBERTY: CIVIL SOCIETY AND ITS RIVALS 5 
(1994). 
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the Federalist Society, Planned Parenthood, the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, the Catholic Church, and “super PACs,” also plays a role in 
struggles over constitutional meaning, and a full account of civil 
society’s role would have to address these influences as well. As the 
success of gun rights groups in establishing a “right to bear arms,” 
“right-to-life” groups in cutting back on rights of reproductive choice, or 
the Chamber of Commerce and similar organizations in invalidating 
restrictions on corporate spending in election campaigns all demonstrate, 
civil society interventions are by no means necessarily progressive. My 
claim is only that we miss out on much of the work of constitutionalism 
if we disregard their role.  
“Civil society constitutionalism,” like “popular constitutionalism”11 
and “democratic constitutionalism,”12 calls for a reorientation of 
constitutional theory and practice away from the traditional focus on 
courts to a consideration of the role of the people. All three concepts can 
be said to stem from Judge Learned Hand’s famous observation that 
“liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no 
constitution, no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no 
court can even do much to help it.”13 “Popular constitutionalism,” as 
articulated by Mark Tushnet and Larry Kramer, among others, is 
affirmatively antagonistic to courts, and seeks to take the Constitution 
away from judges in order to reinfuse the general public with 
responsibility for constitutional meaning.14 “Democratic 
constitutionalism,” advanced by Robert Post and Reva Siegel, embraces 
the role of courts, but stresses the dynamic by which popular responses 
to constitutional decisions help ensure that constitutional law remains 
responsive to contemporary constitutional commitments.15 As such, Post 
and Siegel view positively what others lament as “backlash” to Supreme 
Court decisions, because such popular engagement with constitutional 
questions is critical to maintaining the living and evolving relevance of 
the Constitution.16
  
 11. For “popular constitutionalism,” see LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: 
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING 
THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). 
 Both of these theories offer important insights into the 
role of politics in constitutional law. But these conceptions of 
 12. For “democratic constitutionalism,” see Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: 
Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007). 
 13. Learned Hand, “The Spirit of Liberty” Speech at “I Am an American Day” 
ceremony in Central Park, New York City (May 21, 1944), available at 
www.providenceforum.org/spiritoflibertyspeech. 
 14. See KRAMER, supra note 11; TUSHNET, supra note 11. 
 15. Post & Siegel, supra note 12. 
 16. See generally, id. 
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constitutional law are vulnerable to the criticism that they fail to resolve 
an internal contradiction. If the Constitution is meant to constrain 
democratic politics, how can it be delegated to democratic politics 
without losing its distinctive value as a check on such politics? Just as we 
cannot entrust enforcement of the Constitution to the executive or 
legislative branches without undermining its ability to restrain them, so, 
too, we cannot entrust it to “the people” if it is designed in significant 
part to constrain the people. 
“Civil society constitutionalism” suggests a way out of this internal 
contradiction. It points to the unique role that civil society organizations 
committed to constitutional rights play in bridging the gap between 
formal constitutional law and ordinary politics, and in reinforcing the 
respect for constitutional limits that Learned Hand saw as essential. 
Unlike “popular constitutionalism,” it acknowledges the importance of 
judicial enforcement of constitutional law, because courts are best 
situated to give meaning to long-term constitutional principles and to 
resist short-term political pressures. But “civil society constitutionalism” 
maintains that by standing up for constitutional rights at times when the 
courts, the political branches, and “the people themselves” are likely to 
discount or dismiss such rights, civil society groups help to reinforce the 
culture of rights essential to a robust Constitution. In times of crisis, 
when all other forces are arrayed against constitutional rights, civil 
society organizations may well be the last defense. 
To be sure, the more formal separation of powers also played a 
significant role in checking the President after September 11. For 
example, the Supreme Court imposed important limits on military 
detention and trial,17 and Congress reinforced the universal application of 
the treaty ban on cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.18 But as I will 
show, these were exceptions; the vast majority of curbs on arguably 
lawless initiatives were effectuated without a court order or enactment of 
a statute. And when the Court and Congress did play a checking role, 
their interventions were prompted, framed, and informed by the work of 
civil society.19
  
 17. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 
(2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
  
 18. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1003, 119 Stat. 2680, 
2739-40 (codified at U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006)). 
 19. Josh Benson, Guantánamo Game: Public Choice Perspective on Judicial Review 
in Wartime, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1219, 1241 (2009); Jack Goldsmith, What Changed U.S. 
Attitudes about Counterterrorism Policies, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2012, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/counterterrorism-policies-have-been-
legitimized-by-courts-and-consensus/2012/02/13/gIQA5btbGR_story.html. 
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Thus, in the first post-9/11 decade, constitutional and rule-of-law 
values were brought to bear on executive conduct by the interaction of 
the informal political, legal, and cultural work of civil society and the 
formal operation of law. This experience suggests that while it remains 
critical to adhere to and reinforce formal checks and balances, it is at 
least as important to build up a culture of resilience with respect to 
constitutional rights and the rule of law. Civil society organizations 
dedicated to those values are uniquely situated to play that checking role, 
and constitutional scholarship would do well to examine the particular 
role civil society plays in achieving, building, and reinforcing the 
constitutional culture so central to meaningful constitutional protections. 
Civil society, in short, is where much of the work of democratic and 
popular constitutionalism is done. 
Part II of this essay briefly reviews the arc of counterterrorism policy 
and practice in the United States in the decade since September 11. 
While the government’s initial response seemed to dismiss human rights 
and basic legal constraints in the name of doing everything possible to 
avert another attack, over time the executive branch curtailed virtually all 
of its most aggressive ventures. As a result, the Bush administration in its 
second term was more law-abiding in its counterterrorism policy than it 
was in the first term. President Obama came to office condemning many 
of his predecessor’s choices and vowing to pursue national security 
through the law rather than in opposition to it.20 While significant areas 
of concern remain, the general landscape with respect to legality 
improved substantially under Obama. Some will object that the 
improvements under both administrations were only marginal, leaving a 
deeply troubling apparatus of state power in place. I resist that 
characterization,21
In Part III, I consider what contributed to the restoration of rule-of-
law values. While much attention has been paid to the surprising role of 
the Supreme Court,
 but for purposes of my argument here, one need only 
be convinced that there were indeed curtailments, and that, as I will 
demonstrate below, those changes cannot be attributed to formal checks 
and balances. 
22
  
 20. See infra notes 74-81. 
 I will demonstrate that neither the Court nor 
Congress were the principal points of resistance or protection. The 
Court’s decisions involving “enemy combatants,” while important 
 21. See infra text at notes 252-265 and accompanying text. 
 22. See, e.g., Baher Azmy, Detention, Boumediene, and the New Common Law of 
Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445 (2010); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas 
Corpus, and the War on Terror: An Essay on Law and Political Science, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 352 (2010). 
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contributors to a cultural narrative about constitutional and rule-of-law 
values, were at the same time quite limited in what they actually 
required. Two decisions, Rasul v. Bush and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, rested 
entirely on statutory construction,23 which meant that Congress could—
and in both cases promptly did—reverse their results through ordinary 
legislation.24 Boumediene v. Bush, the most significant of the four 
decisions, concluded that Congress had violated the Constitution’s 
Suspension Clause by repealing habeas corpus for Guantánamo 
detainees, but the decision established only the threshold right to a day in 
court, and said nothing further about what rights the detainees might 
have once their petitions were heard.25 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld held that a 
U.S. citizen captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan allegedly fighting 
as part of a Taliban regiment was constitutionally entitled to a fair 
opportunity to be heard on charges that he was detainable as an “enemy 
combatant.”26 But the Court left the procedural details to be worked out. 
President Bush then managed to avoid elaboration of those constraints by 
transferring Hamdi (and the only other U.S. citizen military detainee, 
Jose Padilla) out of military custody before further Supreme Court 
review.27 As many commentators have previously noted, all four 
decisions were in fact quite minimalist.28
  
 23. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 594; Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480-84. 
 
 24. Rasul v. Bush was superseded by the Detainee Treatment Act. Boumediene, 553 
U.S. at 724-25. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld was superseded by the Military Commissions Act of 
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-336, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006). 
 25. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 795-98. 
 26. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535. 
 27. The only two citizens in military custody at the time of the Hamdi decision were 
Hamdi himself and Jose Padilla. See id. at 577 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The government 
released Hamdi on condition that he agree to go to Saudi Arabia and remain there, a 
promise the government could not enforce. Eric Lichtblau, U.S., Bowing to Court, to 
Free ‘Enemy Combatant,’ N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/23/politics/23hamdi.html. When Jose Padilla’s case 
appeared on its way to the Supreme Court, the government transferred him out of military 
custody and tried him in criminal court, thereby avoiding a Supreme Court showdown. 
See Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582 (4th Cir. 2005) (denying government application to 
transfer Padilla to civilian criminal custody); Hanft v. Padilla, 546 U.S. 1084 (U.S. 2006) 
(granting application to transfer Padilla to civilian criminal custody).  
 28. Neal Devins, Talk Loudly and Carry a Small Stick: The Supreme Court and 
Enemy Combatants, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 491 (2010); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The 
Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror: An Essay on Law and Political 
Science, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 352 (2010); Owen Fiss, The Perils of Minimalism, 9 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES no. 2 art. 13 (2008); Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance 
in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013 (2008); Cass Sunstein, Minimalism at 
War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47 (2004); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues, 
111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 122 (2011). 
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Less noted is the remarkable amount of doctrinal work the Court 
undertook in order to rule against the President. As I will show, none of 
the results in these cases was foreordained by doctrine. What precedent 
there was appeared to favor the president. Furthermore, in two of the 
Guantánamo cases in particular, the legal standards that proved decisive 
were extremely open-ended, turning on questions of “practicability.”29
I will argue that civil society played a critical role both in helping to 
shape these decisions and in pressuring the President to curb his 
initiatives in the many areas that never reached a judicial decision.
 It 
would have been at least as easy, if not easier, to write decisions 
upholding the President’s power. Something was driving the Court, and 
it was not the independent force of legal doctrine. 
30 The 
changes cannot be attributed to ordinary political pressure from “we the 
people;” on few if any of these issues did a majority of the American 
people demand change. Legal battles provided a focal point for much of 
civil society’s work, but only one of many. Civil society’s claims were 
founded on appeals to law and justice—but they were not made solely or 
even predominantly to courts. In the end, it was the interrelationship of 
civil society, law, and culture that succeeded in checking the executive.
Part III concludes by considering alternative accounts of what 
transpired in the first decade after September 11. I find unpersuasive 
contentions that constitutional and human rights were not in any 
significant way restored, and that we have simply normalized the 
exception. I acknowledge that there is a “pendulum” effect, in which 
states typically overreact to crises initially, but correct themselves once 
the crisis has passed,
  
31
The fourth and final section of the article maintains that the role of 
civil society in preserving constitutional rights has important 
implications in three areas: constitutional theory, constitutional law, and 
constitutional practice. First, as a matter of theory, I suggest that 
constitutional scholars would do well to focus more attention on the role 
 but suggest that the arc and speed of the 
pendulum is likely to be affected by the strength of civil society. And 
while there are certainly other factors that contributed to the pressure the 
Bush administration felt to conform its actions to legal norms, including 
widespread dissatisfaction with the Iraq war, I maintain that civil 
society’s work in advocating for constitutional and human rights played 
an important role in shaping the response. 
  
 29. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 759; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518-19. 
 30. See infra notes 94-151 and accompanying text. 
 31. See Richard Matthew & George Shambaugh, The Pendulum Effect: Explaining 
Shifts in the Democratic Response to Terrorism, 5 ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL ISSUES AND PUB. 
POL. (2005), available at http://www.asap-spssi.org/pdf/0501matthew.pdf. 
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civil society plays in effectuating constitutional protections in a 
democracy. The institutional role that the civil society sector plays has 
been largely ignored in constitutional theory to date, even in approaches, 
like “popular constitutionalism,” that stress the importance of the 
public’s constitutional engagement. Understanding how civil society 
reinforces, preserves, and advances constitutionalism would add 
measurably to our understanding of how constitutions actually work. 
Second, the role of civil society in sustaining a robust Constitution 
has implications for the substance of constitutional law—in particular, 
the law that guarantees space for civil society to operate. It underscores 
the fundamental importance of preserving First Amendment safeguards 
for the freedoms of association and speech. In this sense, civil society is 
as dependent on constitutional law as constitutional law is dependent on 
it. Civil society operates under the umbrella of the First Amendment’s 
protection, and in this way the First Amendment plays a structural role in 
sustaining the constitutional system writ large. While the culture of free 
dissent and criticism in the United States has been relatively healthy for 
the most part since September 11, there are troubling signs in the 
targeting of Muslim communities, the resurrection of guilt by association 
in the form of prohibitions on “material support” to proscribed political 
groups,32 and the Supreme Court’s excessive deference in its only 
decided case pitting national security interests against free speech since 
September 11: Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.33
Third, and most importantly, “civil society constitutionalism” has 
implications for constitutional practice; that is, how we live as citizens in 
a constitutional community. The concrete contributions of civil society 
underscore for all of us the critical importance of engagement, through 
civil society organizations and associations, with the constitutional issues 
of our day. As Learned Hand noted, constitutional responsibility 
ultimately lies with us. The most effective way to honor that 
responsibility is to join with others in groups dedicated to constitutional 
and human rights. The strength of a society’s constitutional and human 
rights commitments turns in significant part on its civil society 
organizations, and therefore on our involvement with them. 
 
  
 32. David Cole, TERROR FINANCING, GUILT BY ASSOCIATION, AND THE PARADIGM OF 
PREVENTION IN THE ‘WAR ON TERROR,’ in COUNTERTERRORISM: DEMOCRACY’S 
CHALLENGE (Bianchi & Keller, eds., 2008); Michael G. Freedman, Note, Prosecuting 
Terrorism: The Material Support Statute and Muslim Charities, 38 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 1113, 1114-15 (2011) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B, and 2339C (2006)). 
 33. 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2370 (2010). 
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II. THE ASSAULT ON CONSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS—AND 
THEIR PARTIAL RESTORATION 
Much has undoubtedly changed since September 11. The United 
States launched two wars, one against the country that harbored Al 
Qaeda, the other against a country that did not. The federal government 
undertook the largest bureaucratic reorganization since the New Deal,34 
creating the Department of Homeland Security,35 the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence,36 and the National Counterterrorism 
Center.37 The Federal Bureau of Investigation shifted its focus from law 
enforcement to intelligence-gathering and preventing terrorism, 
aggressively employing informants and provocateurs to “flush out” 
would-be terrorists before they acted—and sometimes, it seemed, even if 
the targets never would have taken any action absent government 
provocation.38 Congress expanded the government’s authority to gather 
intelligence on people within the United States,39 to prosecute speech and 
association that allegedly provided “material support” to groups labeled 
as terrorist organizations,40 and to impose preventive detention and 
military trials on suspected “enemy combatants.”41
A. Initial Measures 
 
The most radical changes in our security operations occurred in the 
first two years after September 11, 2001. The vast majority of them were 
undertaken unilaterally by the Bush administration, though some had 
congressional backing via the USA Patriot Act or the Authorization for 
  
 34. Dan Verton, Ten Years After 9/11—Three Perspectives on Homeland Security’s 
Mission, AOL GOV’T (Sept. 7, 2011), available at http://gov.aol.com/2011/09/07/ten-
years-after-9-11-three-perspectives-on-homeland-securitys/. 
 35. Brief Documentary History of the Department of Homeland Security: 2001-2008, 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. 4, available at http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=37027 (last 
visited June 30, 2012). 
 36. History of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, OFFICE OF THE DIR. 
OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, available at http://www.dni.gov/aboutODNI/history.htm (last 
visited June 30, 2012). 
 37. About the National Counterterrorism Center, NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., 
available at http://www.nctc.gov/about_us/about_nctc.html (last visited June 30, 2012). 
 38. See, e.g., Trevor Aaronson, The Informants, MOTHER JONES (2011), available at 
http://motherjones.com/politics/2011/08/fbi-terrorist-informants. 
 39. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
 40. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006). 
 41. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-336, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006); 
Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2574 (2009). 
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Use of Military Force (AUMF).42 The Bush administration indefinitely 
imprisoned hundreds of people it called “enemy combatants,” sought to 
keep them beyond the reach of courts or the law, and denied them even 
basic Geneva Conventions protections, such as humane treatment—
protections the United States had afforded its foes in all previous armed 
conflicts.43 It “disappeared” suspects into secret CIA prisons, or “black 
sites,” holding them incommunicado and refusing to acknowledge even 
the fact of their detention for years at a time.44 It subjected suspects to 
systematic torture and cruelty, including waterboarding, extended sleep 
deprivation, forced nudity, slamming them into walls, and forcing them 
into painful stress positions for hours at a time.45
  
 42. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); AUMF, Pub. L. No. 
107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). Congress also implicitly authorized some of these 
initiatives through its decisions to fund them. However, many of the programs, including 
“enhanced interrogation techniques,” the CIA’s black sites, renditions, and the NSA’s 
warrantless surveillance, were covert, and therefore Congress as a whole was unaware of 
them. See Tom Daschle, Power We Didn’t Grant, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2005, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/12/22/AR2005122201101.html. While the executive branch 
briefed the “Gang of Eight” (the leaders of the two parties from both the Senate and 
House of Representatives, and the chairs and ranking minority members of both the 
Senate and House Intelligence Committees) on these covert operations, the briefings were 
conducted on the condition that these eight members not share what they learned with 
anyone else, including their colleagues. As a result, this “notification” did not in any 
meaningful sense put Congress on notice regarding the executive’s actions. See ALFRED 
CUMMING, CONG. RES. SERV., R40691, SENSITIVE COVERT ACTION NOTIFICATIONS: 
OVERSIGHT OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS (2009), available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/126834.pdf. 
 It “rendered” still other 
 43. Kate Martin & Joe Onek, “Enemy Combatants,” The Constitution and the 
Administration’s “War on Terror,” AM. CONST. SOCIETY FOR L. AND POL’Y (2004), 
available at http://www.acslaw.org/pdf/enemycombatants.pdf. President Bush took the 
position that the Geneva Conventions, including Common Article 3, did not protect Al 
Qaeda detainees, but stated that “as a matter of policy,” the military would treat detainees 
“humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a 
manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.” Memorandum from The White House 
on Humane Treatment of Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), available at 
http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf. However, the 
Geneva Conventions recognize no exception to the obligation of humane treatment, for 
“military necessity” or otherwise. 
 44. Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 
2002, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644.html; see also JANE MAYER, THE 
DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON 
AMERICAN IDEALS 145 (2008) (discussing CIA secret prisons). 
 45. MAYER, supra note 44, at 220 (discussing coercive interrogation tactics); Mark 
Danner, US Torture: Voices from the Black Sites, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Apr. 9, 2009), 
available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/apr/09/us-torture-voices-
from-the-black-sites/?pagination=false. 
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suspects to security services in countries, such as Syria, Egypt, and 
Morocco, that we had long condemned for using torture as a tool of 
interrogation, apparently so that they could torture them for us and share 
any resulting intelligence.46
The Bush administration unilaterally created “military commissions” 
affording only the most summary process to alleged terrorists.
 
47 As 
originally formulated, the president’s rules would have permitted the 
imposition of the death penalty on the basis of evidence gained from 
torture, without any independent judicial review.48 The administration 
authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to conduct warrantless 
wiretapping, including of U.S. citizens, despite a federal law that made 
such surveillance a crime.49 It subjected more than five thousand Arab 
and Muslim foreign nationals within the United States to preventive 
detention in the first two years after 9/11—not one of whom stands 
convicted of a terrorist offense.50 Furthermore, it insisted that, as 
commander in chief, the President had unchecked authority under Article 
II to take any action he deemed necessary to “engage the enemy,” even if 
Congress or international law expressly forbade it.51 In short, in the 
administration’s view, the Constitution effectively placed the President 
above the law when it came to engaging the enemy during wartime.52
  
 46. JANE MAYER, supra note 44, at 110 (discussing extraordinary renditions to 
torture). 
 
 47. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain 
Noncitizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) 
[hereinafter Tribunal Order]. 
 48. Id.  
 49. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Court, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html?pagewanted=print. 
 50. DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS LOSING THE 
WAR ON TERROR 107-09 (2007). 
 51. See, e.g., U.S. Justice Dep’t, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for Alberto 
R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in DAVID COLE, THE TORTURE 
MEMOS: RATIONALIZING THE UNTHINKABLE 1-40 (2009) [hereinafter Aug. 1, 2002 
Torture Memo]. 
 52. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of 
Legal Counsel, to the Deputy Counsel to the President (Sept. 25, 2001), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/olc/warpowers425.htm [hereinafter Yoo Memo]; cf. David J. 
Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb, 121 HARV. 
L. REV. 689, 694 (2008) and David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in 
Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941 (2008) 
(showing that, in fact, Congress has historically regulated virtually all aspects of military 
decisions during wartime, and that the President’s commander-in-chief power is largely 
limited to barring Congress from placing the direction of the troops under someone else’s 
command); Jules Lobel, Conflicts between the Commander in Chief and Congress: 
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Times like these test the limits of the rule of law. Carl Schmitt 
argued that in periods of emergency, legality and legitimacy diverge and 
all that matters is legitimacy, which, in turn, is earned not by following 
the rules but by delivering security.53
B. Restoring Constitutional and Human Rights 
 After the attacks of September 11, 
the nation wanted security, and the Bush administration took that 
demand as a mandate to thrust legal restrictions aside.  
In retrospect, what is most striking about the U.S.’s response is not 
that it overreacted, but that in time was compelled to modify all of its 
most aggressive initiatives. When the memorandum authorizing the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to use waterboarding and other forms 
of torture and cruelty was leaked and published by The Washington Post, 
triggering considerable denunciations, the Bush administration retracted 
it.54 When civil society groups, legal experts, and even conservative New 
York Times columnist William Safire, condemned the military 
commissions for the absence of judicial review,55 then-White House 
Counsel Alberto Gonzales wrote an op-ed in the New York Times 
claiming that the President never meant to deny judicial review—despite 
having said exactly that in his original order.56
  
Concurrent Power Over the Conduct of War, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 691 (2008) (same); David 
Cole, Reviving the Nixon Doctrine: NSA Spying, the Commander-in-Chief, and Executive 
Power in the War on Terror, 13 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 1 (2006) 
(arguing that the Bush administration’s Article II theory cannot support its asserted 
authority to ignore a criminal statute regulating wiretapping). 
 President Bush eventually 
moved all the detainees held in “black sites” to Guantánamo Bay prison, 
where they were no longer considered “disappeared,” and where the 
International Committee for the Red Cross was for the first time granted 
 53. CARL SCHMITT, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY 4-13 (1932). 
 54. Stephen Gillers, The Torture Memo, THE NATION (Apr. 9, 2008), available at 
http://www.thenation.com/article/torture-memo. 
 55. William Safire, Seizing Dictatorial Power, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/15/opinion/essay-seizing-dictatorial-power.html; 
William Safire, Kangaroo Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2001, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/26/opinion/essay-kangaroo-courts.html. 
 56. Alberto Gonzales, Martial Justice, Full and Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/30/opinion/30GONZ.html. The executive order 
creating the military commissions provided that for persons subject to the order, military 
commissions would have “exclusive jurisdiction,” and “the individual shall not be 
privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to 
have any such remedy or proceeding sought on the individual’s behalf, in (i) any court of 
the United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any 
international tribunal.” Tribunal Order, supra note 47. 
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access to them.57 When civil society groups, European nations, and 
others denounced renditions to torture, the administration seemed to 
place the program on hold, and reports of such extraordinary renditions 
ceased.58 In addition, after The New York Times revealed the NSA’s 
illegal warrantless wiretapping program59 and the ACLU and the Center 
for Constitutional Rights challenged the program’s legality in court, the 
administration, which had been acting without a warrant, applied for and 
obtained a court order under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA), which authorizes surveillance subject to judicial oversight.60 The 
administration ultimately sought amendments to that Act, which made 
clear that the program could continue pursuant to legislative and judicial 
authorization.61
In a series of extraordinary cases reviewing the administration’s 
asserted authority to hold “enemy combatants” beyond the law’s reach, 
the Supreme Court thrice rejected the administration’s position that 
judicial review was unavailable,
 
62 even after Congress had twice sought 
to insulate those detentions from judicial review.63
  
 57. See President Bush’s Speech on Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/06/washington/06bush_transcript.html?pagewanted=all. 
 The Court overruled 
the administration’s position that the Geneva Conventions were 
inapplicable to Al Qaeda detainees, thereby confirming that they had a 
 58. European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Alleged 
secret detentions and unlawful inter-state transfers involving Council of Europe member 
states, Draft report 2006). Extraordinary renditions to torture seem to have been 
employed most aggressively in the first few years of the Bush administration, and there 
are far fewer reports thereafter. See MAYER, supra note 44. 
 59. See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 49. 
 60. Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General, to Patrick Leahy, Chairman, 
Senate Judiciary Committee, and Arlen Specter, Ranking Minority Member, Senate 
Judiciary Committee (Jan. 17, 2007), available at 
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/politics/20060117gonzales_Letter.pdf 
(describing the end of unilateral program and the issuance of a judicial order authorizing 
surveillance). Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1782 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1862 (2006)). 
 61. See Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, § 105B(g), 121 Stat. 552, 
553-554 (2007).  
 62. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771; Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 576-77; Rasul, 542 U.S. at 
473. 
 63. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 473 (extending statutory habeas jurisdiction to Guantánamo 
prisoners) was superseded by the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 
§ 1003, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739-40 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006)), which sought 
to repeal habeas corpus for Guantánamo detainees. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 576-77, which 
interpreted the Detainee Treatment Act as not applicable to pending cases, was in turn 
superseded by the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-336, 120 Stat. 
2600 (2006), which repealed habeas corpus for Guantánamo detainees for all cases. 
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right to humane treatment.64 The Court refuted the administration’s 
position that it could hold U.S. citizens as “enemy combatants” without a 
hearing and an adequate opportunity to defend themselves.65 And it 
declared President Bush’s scheme for military commissions illegal.66
In each instance in which the Bush administration reined in its 
programs, it did so reluctantly. Indeed, it was so reluctant that it 
sometimes sought to give the impression that it was complying with the 
law, while secretly continuing to act lawlessly. Thus, after the Justice 
Department retracted its August 1, 2002, “torture memo,”
 
67 it secretly 
wrote a series of additional memos that continued to give the CIA a 
green light to employ waterboarding and other inhumane and coercive 
interrogation tactics,68 even though, in practice, waterboarding was 
reportedly performed on only three detainees after September 11.69 And 
while it transferred detainees out of the CIA’s secret prisons in Romania, 
Poland, and elsewhere after the Supreme Court ruled that the Geneva 
Convention protected Al Qaeda detainees,70 it kept the prisons open for 
potential future use.71 It never formally abandoned the “extraordinary 
rendition” program, even as reports of such renditions grew less and less 
frequent.72
In his presidential campaign, Barack Obama vigorously attacked the 
Bush administration’s lawless ways, and promised meaningful reform.
 Still, by the second term of the Bush administration, U.S. 
counterterrorism policy and practices had stepped back substantially 
from their immediate post-September 11 origins. 
73
  
 64. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 628-35. 
 
He did not feel constrained by the politics of fear to avoid these issues, or 
to echo President Bush’s bellicosity. Immediately upon taking office, 
 65. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532-33, (2007). 
 66. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631-35. 
 67. See Aug. 1, 2002 Torture Memo supra note 51. 
 68. David Cole, The Torture Memos: The Case Against the Lawyers, N.Y. REV. OF 
BOOKS (Oct. 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/oct/08/the-torture-memos-the-case-
against-the-lawyers/. 
 69. See id. See also Randall Mikkelsen, CIA Says [it] Used Waterboarding on Three 
Suspects, REUTERS.COM (Feb. 5, 2008), available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/02/05/us-security-usa-waterboarding-
idUSN0517815120080205. 
 70. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 628-35. 
 71. See MAYER, supra note 44. 
 72. David Johnston, U.S. Says Rendition to Continue, But With More Oversight, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 23, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/25/us/politics/25rendition.html. 
 73. See, e.g., Kate Zernicke, McCain and Obama Split on Justices’ Guantánamo 
Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/13/us/politics/13candidates.html?_r=3&ref=politics&o
ref=slogin&oref=slogin. 
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President Obama closed the CIA’s secret prisons, barred the use of 
“enhanced interrogation techniques,” and vowed to close Guantánamo 
within a year.74 President Obama released several previously secret 
Justice Department memos that had authorized torture and cruel 
treatment, in the President’s own words, “to ensure that the actions 
described within them never take place again.”75 In May 2009, he 
delivered a major speech on the importance of fighting terrorism within 
the rule of law, insisting that “time and again, our values have been our 
best national security asset.”76
President Obama expressly renounced his predecessor’s theory that 
the Commander-in-Chief had unilateral power to violate the law, and 
maintained instead that his authority was limited by the scope of 
Congress’s Authorization for Use of Military Force, which had been 
issued shortly after the September 11 attacks.
 
77 And when, in 2010, a 
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that the 
President’s authority to detain was not bound by the laws of war,78 the 
Obama administration took the extraordinary step of arguing that the 
court had granted it too much power.79 It told the full court that the 
President’s authority is indeed constrained by the laws of war.80 The full 
court then expressly noted that the panel’s prior reasoning was 
nonbinding dicta, unnecessary to the result.81
  
 74. See Scott Shane, Obama Orders Secret Prisons and Detention Camps Closed, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/23/us/politics/23GITMOCND.html?pagewanted=all. 
This promise has been frustrated by Congressional opposition to moving any 
Guantánamo detainees into the United States. See Remarks by John Brennan at Brennan 
Center Symposium, Mar. 18, 2011, available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/remarks_by_john_brennan_at_brennan_c
enter_symposium/. 
 
 75. Press Release, White House, Statement of President Barack Obama on Release of 
OLC Memos (Apr. 16, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-of-President-Barack-Obama-on-
Release-of-OLC-Memos. 
 76. Press Release, White House, Remarks of the President on National Security (May 
21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-
President-On-National-Security-5-21-09. 
 77. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)). 
 78. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 79. Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 1-2, Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/US-
response-re-rehear-Al-Bihani-5-13-10.pdf. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Al-Bihani v. Obama, rehearing denied, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (denying 
rehearing but making clear that panel opinion discussion of international law was dicta). 
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There remain many areas of concern, to be sure. The United States 
has a widely used secret policy of targeted killing, which it has used to 
kill an American citizen in Yemen, far from the battlefield in 
Afghanistan, without evidence that he was involved in an imminent 
attack on the United States.82 The Obama administration has largely 
maintained its predecessor’s stance on the “state secrets” privilege, using 
the privilege not merely to protect secrets from disclosure, but to block 
altogether lawsuits seeking to hold government officials and their 
collaborators accountable for torture and other criminal conduct.83 The 
Obama administration defended an expansive reading of the “material 
support” statute, taking the position that it is a crime even to file an 
amicus brief in the Supreme Court if filed on behalf of a group labeled 
“terrorist.”84 It opposed the extension of habeas corpus review to 
detainees held at Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan, even including 
those captured in other countries far from the battlefield and brought to 
Bagram instead of Guantánamo.85 And the Obama administration 
opposed all efforts to pursue accountability for the war crimes, including 
torture, authorized by high-level U.S. officials in the “war on terror.”86
  
 82. See, e.g., David Cole, Killing Our Citizens Without Trial, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, 
(Nov. 24, 2011), available at 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/nov/24/killing-our-citizens-without-
trial/?pagination=false; Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt, & Robert F. Worth, Two-Year 
Manhunt Led to Killing of Awlaki in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-is-killed-in-
yemen.html?pagewanted=all; Greg Miller, Under Obama, an emergency apparatus for 
drone killing, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2011, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/under-obama-an-emerging-
global-apparatus-for-drone-killing/2011/12/13/gIQANPdILP_story.html. 
 
Still, there is little doubt that U.S. counterterrorism policy today is 
significantly more consistent with constitutional and international law 
than it was in the first couple of years after the September 11 attacks. 
 83. Ryan Deveraux, Is Obama’s Use of State Secrets Privilege the New Normal?, THE 
NATION (Sept. 29, 2010), available at http://www.thenation.com/article/155080/obamas-
use-state-secrets-privilege-new-normal. 
 84. Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. 
Ct. 2705 (2010), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-1498.pdf 
(quoting Solicitor General Elena Kagan). 
 85. Owen Fiss, A Predicament of His Own Making, BOSTON REV. (2011), available at 
http://www.bostonreview.net/BR36.3/owen_fiss_Guantánamo_bay_military_tribunals.ph
p. 
 86. United States: Investigate Bush, Other Top Officials for Torture, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (Jul. 22, 2011), available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/11/united-states-
investigate-bush-other-top-officials-torture. 
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These historical developments suggest that the values of 
constitutionalism and legality proved more tenacious than many cynics 
and “realists” would have predicted, certainly than many in the Bush 
administration imagined. The most powerful nation in the world was 
compelled to substantially curb each of its arguably lawless ventures. 
While the reforms were in most instances partial, and there remains 
further work to be done, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that 
reforms were indeed adopted with respect to virtually all of these 
measures. 
As noted above, for purposes of my argument, one need only be 
persuaded that there were indeed curbs put in place, that those curbs 
cannot be attributed to formal checks and balances or majoritarian 
political pressure, and that those curbs were not mere window-dressing 
(a charge I address below).87
III. CHECKS, BALANCES, AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
 In the following section, I turn to a 
consideration of the mechanisms by which these reforms were achieved. 
What led the United States to curtail so many of its legally dubious 
counterterrorism policies in the first decade after September 11? The 
framers of the Constitution created a divided government in order to 
limit overreaching by any one branch, and established judicial review to 
ensure that we would have a government “of laws, not men.”88 In 
ordinary times, that structure of checks and balances functions 
reasonably well. But in times of crisis, it has repeatedly proved 
inadequate. In World War I, Congress made it a crime to speak against 
the war, the executive prosecuted hundreds for doing so, and the 
Supreme Court upheld the sentences.89 During World War II, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s administration interned more than 110,000 people of 
Japanese descent, Congress did nothing to challenge him, and the 
Supreme Court upheld the internment policy as constitutional, despite 
recognizing that it discriminated on the basis of race.90
  
 87. See infra notes 252-265 and accompanying text. 
 And in the 
McCarthy era, Congress and the Truman administration imposed guilt by 
association on Communist “sympathizers,” and the Supreme Court did 
nothing to restrain them until the Senate had censured McCarthy, and he 
 88. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
 89. See, e.g., Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216-17 (1919); see generally 
GEOFFREY STONE, IN PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT 
OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 135-204 (2004). 
 90. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944); DAVID COLE, ENEMY 
ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON 
TERRORISM 88-104 (2003). 
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and his allies had lost power and public influence.91 In each crisis, the 
political branches were more likely to goad each other on to further 
excesses than to impose limits, and the Supreme Court either expressly 
affirmed what went on or looked the other way.92
Scholars have long worried about this dynamic, expressing concern 
that if the judicial and legislative branches fail to impose checks on the 
executive in periods of crisis, there will be no limit to executive 
overreaching and abuse.
 
93
A. The Role of Civil Society 
 In the first post-9/11 decade, however, 
executive overreaching was in fact checked, and checked in significant 
part by forces extraneous to the separation of powers. Civil society 
groups, using legal claims as focal points for their work, appear to have 
played an important role in the story.  
The vast majority of the reforms introduced by the executive were 
not ordered by a court or compelled by statute. No detainee has been 
released by order of a court against the executive’s will, yet more than 
600 of the 779 people once held at Guantánamo Bay have been 
released.94 Neither Congress nor any court ordered administrative 
hearings or access to attorneys for Guantánamo detainees, yet all 
detainees now have those rights. Neither Congress nor any court ordered 
that the International Committee for the Red Cross be granted access to 
detainees in the conflict with Al Qaeda, yet today such access is 
routinely afforded. Neither Congress nor any court ordered the end of 
“enhanced interrogation techniques,” but President Obama banned these 
techniques,95 and rescinded and disclosed previously secret Justice 
Department memos that had twisted the law to give a green light to such 
methods.96
  
 91. See STONE, supra note 89, at 311-426; COLE, ENEMY ALIENS, supra note 90 at 
129. 
 Neither Congress nor any court rejected President Bush’s 
claims of uncheckable authority as Commander-in-Chief under Article II 
 92. See generally STONE, supra note 89. 
 93. See, e.g., CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS 
GOVERNMENT IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES (1948); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE 
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973). 
 94. Charlie Savage & Matthew Rosenberg, Republican Report Criticizes Transfers 
From Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2012, at A10. 
 95. Mark Mazzetti, Obama Issues Directive to Shut Down Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 22, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/us/politics/22gitmo.html?pagewanted=all. 
 96. Ewen MacAskill, Barack Obama Releases Bush administration Torture Memos, 
THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 16, 2009), available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/16/torture-memos-bush-administration. 
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of the Constitution, yet President Obama abandoned it.97 Neither 
Congress nor any court ordered suspension of the NSA spying program, 
but President Bush suspended it in 2007, proceeding instead with a 
program approved by a FISA court.98 Neither Congress nor any court 
questioned the widespread preventive detention of Muslim and Arab 
immigrants in the United States in the first years after September 11, but 
that practice was widely condemned, and has not been repeated.99 
Neither Congress nor any court has expressed any opinion on the legality 
of the “extraordinary rendition” program, but there have been no 
reported renditions to torture in years.100 Neither Congress nor any court 
so required, but the CIA’s “black sites” are now closed.101 And neither 
Congress nor any ?????? ???????? ?????????? ??? ????????? ????????????????
national program of ethnic and religious profiling that selectively 
required foreign nationals of predominantly Arab and Muslim countries 
to be fingerprinted, photographed, and interviewed102????? ??? ??????
2011, after much criticism from civil liberties groups, the government 
ended the program.103
If most of these reforms were attributable neither to judicial 
enforcement nor to congressional mandates, what were the moving 
forces behind them? The answer is to be found outside the formal 
institutions of government, in civil society—the loosely coordinated 
political actions of concerned individuals and groups, here and abroad. 
Following September 11, many organizations took up the mantle of 
defending liberty, human rights, and the rule of law—among them the 
 While some of the reforms are attributable to 
President Obama, many were undertaken by President Bush. 
  
 97. David Cole, Breaking Away: Obama’s war on terror is not “Bush Lite,” THE 
NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 8, 2010), available at 
http://www.tnr.com/article/magazine/politics/79752/breaking-away-obama-bush-aclu-
Guantánamo-war-on-terror. 
 98. See Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, supra note 60. 
 99. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: 
A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 21 (2003), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf. 
 100. See generally Michael John Garcia, Renditions: Constraints Imposed by Laws on 
Torture, CRS Report for Congress, at 7 (Sept. 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32890.pdf. 
 101. Reed Brody, Getting Away with Torture, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2 (2011), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0711webwcover.pdf. 
 102. COLE, ENEMY ALIENS, supra note 90, at 50; Removing Designated Countries 
From the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System, 76 Fed. Reg. 23830 (Apr. 28, 
2011). 
 103. See Letter from Margo Schlanger, Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 
Department of Homeland Security, to Colleagues (Apr. 27, 2011), available at 
http://www.ilw.com/immigrationdaily/news/2011,0428-schlanger.pdf. 
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American Civil Liberties Union, the Center for Constitutional Rights, 
Human Rights First, Human Rights Watch, the Council on American-
Islamic Relations, the Bill of Rights Defense Committee, the 
Constitution Project, the Muslim Public Affairs Council, and the 
American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee.104
The Center for Constitutional Rights brought the first lawsuit seeking 
habeas review at Guantánamo, and went on to coordinate a nationwide 
network of volunteer attorneys who represented Guantánamo habeas 
petitioners.
 These organizations 
are all, in one way or another, dedicated to the protection of 
constitutional and human rights. They consist of individuals—citizens 
and noncitizens, lawyers and laypersons—drawn together by a common 
commitment to rule-of-law values, and they seek to further those values 
both politically and legally—doing public education, lobbying Congress 
and the executive, filing lawsuits, writing reports, and organizing grass-
roots campaigns. 
105 The ACLU filed important lawsuits challenging secrecy 
and government excesses, and succeeded, through the Freedom of 
Information Act, in disgorging many details about the government’s 
illegal interrogation program.106 Both the ACLU and Center for 
Constitutional Rights filed lawsuits and engaged in public advocacy on 
behalf of torture and rendition victims, and challenged the NSA’s 
warrantless wiretapping program.107 Human Rights Watch and Human 
Rights First wrote important reports on detention, torture, and 
Guantánamo.108
  
 104. See C. Raj Kumar, Moving Beyond Constitutionalism and Judicial Protection of 
Human Rights, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 281, 282 (2003). 
 The Bill of Rights Defense Committee launched a multi-
 105. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); see Illegal Detentions and Guantánamo, 
CTR. FOR CONST. RIGHTS, http://ccrjustice.org/illegal-detentions-and-guantanamo (last 
visited June 30, 2012). 
 106. Accountability for Torture: Restore the Rule of Law, ACLU, available at 
http://www.aclu.org/accountability/ (last visited July 31, 2012); ACLU, The Torture 
Report, available at http://www.thetorturereport.org/ (last visited July 31, 2012). 
 107. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 
(2010); Mohammmed v. Jeppeson Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 141 S. Ct. 2442 (2011); ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007); In re NSA 
Telecomms. Records Litig., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13304 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2009); 
CCR Warrantless Wiretapping Case Dismissed By Federal Judge, CTR. FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, Feb. 1, 2011, available at http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-
releases/ccr-warrantless-wiretapping-case-dismissed-federal-judge.  
 108. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Getting Away With Torture: Command 
Responsibility for U.S. Abuse of Detainees (2005), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0405.pdf. Presumption of Guilt, supra 
note 3; The Case to Close Guantánamo, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/our-work/law-and-security/closegitmo/about/ (last 
visited June 30, 2012). 
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year grassroots campaign that urged towns, cities, and eventually states 
to enact resolutions condemning the civil liberties abuses of the Bush 
administration.109 That campaign ultimately succeeded in getting over 
400 such resolutions passed, by most of the nation’s largest cities, 
hundreds of small and medium-sized towns, and several states.110
After 9/11, the President, Congress, the courts, and the public at 
large were all driven to emphasize security over all other values. Yet 
civil society organizations actively advocated for the enforcement of 
constitutional and human rights. And in a sense, they were rewarded for 
doing so. Many organizations saw their membership and financial 
support grow dramatically in the wake of 9/11, despite (or because of) 
the fact that their claims were in tension with those of the majority.
 These 
efforts are but a small subset of the broader activities of civil society, at 
home and abroad, that helped to bring to public attention the Bush 
administration’s most questionable initiatives, and to portray the 
initiatives as contrary to constitutional and human rights. 
111
Civil society critics of the administration also included prestigious 
bar associations, most importantly the American Bar Association, which 
adopted resolutions on torture, Guantánamo, military commissions, and 
the “state secrets” privilege, and submitted amicus briefs in the 
Guantánamo cases before the Supreme Court.
 
When the formal mechanisms of the separation of powers were least 
likely to check executive initiative, these organizations were in some 
measure at their strongest. As such, they were uniquely situated to 
provide a checking influence within American political culture.  
112 In addition, the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York published multiple 
reports on rendition,113 interrogations,114 and military commissions.115
  
 109. See David Cole, Uncle Sam Is Watching You, N.Y.  REV. OF BOOKS, Nov. 18, 
2004 (discussing Bill of Rights Defense Committee campaign). 
 
 110. Resolutions Passed and Efforts Underway, By State, BILL OF RIGHTS DEFENSE 
COMMITTEE, http://www.bordc.org/list.php (last visited June 30, 2012). 
 111. See, e.g., Jim Drinkard, ACLU membership surges in post-9/11 world, USA 
TODAY (Oct. 12, 2002), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2002-12-10-aclu-
usat_x.htm. 
 112. See Neal Sonnett, Ten Years Later: The ABA Response to 9/11, Human Rights, 38 
A.B.A. HUMAN RIGHTS (2010-11) (listing ABA resolutions and amicus briefs). 
 113. ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., TORTURE BY PROXY: INTERNATIONAL 
AND DOMESTIC LAW APPLICABLE TO “EXTRAORDINARY RENDITIONS” (2004), available at 
http://www.chrgj.org/docs/TortureByProxy.pdf. 
 114. ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., COMM. ON INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS, COMM. 
ON MILITARY AFFAIRS AND JUST., HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO THE UNITED 
STATES’ INTERROGATION OF DETAINEES, http://www.abcny.org/pdf/HUMANRIGHTS.pdf 
(last visited June 30, 2012). 
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The International Commission of Jurists convened an international panel 
of eminent jurists, which issued an important report on preserving human 
rights in fighting terrorism that was highly critical of the United States’ 
approach.116
Human Rights First enlisted retired generals to oppose the Bush 
administration’s decisions to deny detainees the protections of the 
Geneva Conventions and the Convention Against Torture. The generals 
issued statements, signed joint letters, and met with members of 
Congress and the executive branch. Their intervention helped Congress 
overcome vigorous opposition from the White House and reaffirm that 
the prohibition on cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment applied to all 
persons held by the United States, no matter what their nationality or 
where they were held.
 
117
Many individual defenders of liberty also spoke out, including Lord 
Steyn, a former British Law Lord who famously labeled Guantánamo a 
“legal black hole,”
 
118 175 members of the U.K. Parliament who signed 
an amicus brief on behalf of Guantánamo detainees in the first detainee 
case to reach the Supreme Court;119 and individual members of 
Congress, especially Senators Patrick Leahy, Richard Durbin, Russell 
Feingold, and Bernie Sanders, and Representatives John Conyers Jr., 
Jerrold Nadler, and Keith Ellison.120 These individuals echoed civil 
society’s insistence that the rule of law should not be abandoned in the 
pursuit of security.121
The media, a particularly influential part of civil society, and often 
an ally to constitutional and human rights groups, also played an 
 
  
 115. See, e.g., ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., COMM. ON MILITARY AFFAIRS 
AND JUST., INTER ARMA SILENT LEGES: SHOULD THE LAWS BE SILENT?, available at 
http://www.abcny.org/pdf/report/should_the_laws.pdf (last visited June 30, 2012). 
 116. INT’L COMM. OF JURISTS, ASSESSING DAMAGE, URGING ACTION (2009), available 
at http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/specialmeetings/2011/docs/icj/icj-2009-ejp-report.pdf. 
 117. See, e.g., Deborah Pearlstein, Finding Effective Constraints on Executive Power: 
Interrogation, Detention, and Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1255, 1279-87 (2006) (detailing 
efforts of Human Rights First and retired senior military officers on issues of torture 
policy). 
 118. Johan Steyn, Guantánamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, Twenty-Seventh FA Mann 
Lecture at the British Inst. Of Int’l and Comparative Law (2003), available at 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/nov/Guantánamo/pdf. 
 119. Brief of 175 Members of Both Houses of the Parliament of the U.K. of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Rasul v. Bush, 542 
U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-343, 03-334), available at 
http://Guantánamobile.org/pdfirish/pdf. 
 120. See, e.g., 147 Cong. Rec. S10989, S10990-991 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) 
(statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getpage.cgi?position=all&page=S10990&dbname=2001_record. 
 121. Id. 
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important role. It was the media that published the leaked Office of Legal 
Counsel memorandum authorizing waterboarding and other illegal 
tactics,122 disclosed the existence of CIA secret prisons,123 told the stories 
of rendition and abusive detentions,124 disseminated the photographs 
from Abu Ghraib, and revealed the existence of a massive and possibly 
criminal warrantless wiretapping program run by the National Security 
Agency at President Bush’s orders.125
Perhaps buoyed by civil society, lawyers and officials within the 
government also resisted government abuse. Navy General Counsel 
Alberto Mora personally intervened to pressure Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld to rescind an order authorizing cruel and degrading 
interrogation tactics at Guantánamo.
 Moreover, the press wrote and 
published countless editorials questioning President Bush’s initiatives on 
detention, interrogation, ethnic profiling, surveillance, and other 
counterterrorism policies.  
 126 Joseph Darby, an Army reservist 
in Iraq, helped bring torture and other war crimes at Abu Ghraib to the 
world’s attention by delivering a CD containing photographs of abuse at 
Abu Ghraib prison to the Army’s Criminal Investigation Command.127 
Col. Morris Davis, an Air Force lawyer, resigned in 2008 from his 
position as Chief Prosecutor in the Guantánamo military commissions 
system to protest plans to rely on evidence obtained through coerced 
testimony.128 Others risked criminal prosecution by leaking secret 
information about programs that violated criminal law, including the CIA 
“enhanced interrogation techniques” and the NSA’s warrantless 
wiretapping program.129
  
 122. Dana Priest & R. Jeffrey Smith, Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture, 
WASH. POST, June 8, 2004, at A1.  
 In each instance, what drove these government 
officials to speak up was, in a fundamental sense, the respect for liberty, 
 123. Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 
2005, at A1. 
 124. Reed Brody, Getting Away with Torture, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2 (2011), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0711webwcover.pdf. 
 125. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. 
 126. See Jane Mayer, The Memo, NEW YORKER (Feb. 22, 2006), available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/02/27/060227fa_fact. 
 127. See Jameel Jaffer & Larry Siems, Honoring Those Who Said No, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 27, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/opinion/28jaffer.html. 
 128. William Glaberson, Former Prosecutor to Testify for Detainee, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
28, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/28/us/28gitmo.html?pagewanted=all. 
 129. Mark Memmot, Justice Drops Probe of Leaker Who Exposed Bush-Era 
Wiretapping, NPR, Apr. 26, 2011, http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
way/2011/04/26/135735752/report-justice-drops-probe-of-leaker-who-exposed-bush-era-
wiretapping. 
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human dignity, and the rule of law that civil society organizations were 
vigorously defending. 
In the absence of effective formal avenues for checking at home, 
civil society groups often operated at a transnational level to bring 
pressure to bear on the United States. Domestic organizations played a 
leading role, to be sure; but perhaps more than in any prior crisis, 
international pressure had a key part. The Internet and globalization have 
made it infinitely easier for civil society institutions to share information 
and collaborate across national borders. For example, a report by Human 
Rights First on the treatment of those rounded up after September 11 is 
immediately accessible on its website from all parts of the world.130 In 
part because most of the victims of U.S. government overreaching were 
nationals of other countries—Guantánamo, for example, housed 
prisoners from forty-two different nations131—domestic avenues for 
redress were often unresponsive. But by the same token, the countries 
from which the victims came were often keenly interested in the plight of 
their citizens at U.S. hands. As a matter of necessity, the tactics of 
constitutional and human rights groups began to merge. Civil society 
organizations accustomed to invoking “hard law” domestic remedies 
were forced to look elsewhere for support. Constitutional rights 
organizations had to adopt the transnational “shaming” tactics of human 
rights groups accustomed to operating with “soft law” tools. One civil 
society organization initially created to represent detainees at 
Guantánamo, Reprieve, located its headquarters in London because it 
found that international pressure was more effective in freeing prisoners 
than the formal avenues of the American legal system.132 Reprieve 
represented more than fifty Guantánamo prisoners, of whom all but 
fifteen have been released.133 Yet only one was ordered released by a 
federal court.134
Stories of rights violations often garnered more attention in the 
victim’s home country than in the United States. Consider, for example, 
Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen who the United States stopped at New 
York’s JFK Airport as he was changing planes on his way home to 
Canada, and forcibly rerouted to Syria via a federally chartered jet, 
  
  
 130. See Human Rights Watch, Presumption of Guilt: Human Rights Abuses of Post-
September 11 Detainees (Aug. 2002). 
 131. Scott Michaelson & Scot Cutler Shershow, The Guantánamo “Black Hole”: The 
Law of War and the Sovereign Exception, DERECHOS (2004), available at 
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/excep/merip1.html. 
 132. See generally REPRIEVE, http://www.reprieve.org.uk/ (last visited June 30, 2012). 
 133. Emily Bolton, Reprieve Turns Ten, REPRIEVE (Jan. 1, 2009), available at 
http://www.reprieve.org.uk/blog/reprieveturnsten/. 
 134. Id. 
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where he was tortured and locked in an underground cell the size of a 
grave for nearly a year.135 Arar is a household name in Canada.136 His 
return to Canada sparked a high-level commission of inquiry, resulting in 
a full exoneration.137 The Canadian Parliament issued Arar a formal 
apology and paid him ten million dollars (Canadian) for his injuries, even 
though it was the United States, not Canada, that decided to send Arar to 
Syria.138 In 2004, Time (Canada) named Arar its Person of the Year.139 In 
the United States, by contrast, the government successfully moved to 
dismiss a lawsuit Arar brought against the federal officials who sent him 
to be tortured, and it is likely that few people would recognize his 
name.140
The international concerns sparked by reports of such abuses made 
their way back to the United States. Many nations lobbied the United 
States to release their nationals from Guantánamo.
 
141 The global nature 
of the terrorist threat required the United States to obtain the assistance 
and cooperation of intelligence and law enforcement agencies of other 
nations,142 and that need required the United States to be more sensitive 
to international criticism than it might otherwise have been. At the same 
time, international attention to U.S. abuses, especially at Abu Ghraib and 
Guantánamo, played into Al Qaeda’s hands, as it fueled resentment of 
the United States and recruitment for Al Qaeda.143
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J., (Mar. 19, 2009) available at 
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time the first habeas corpus case, Rasul v. Bush, reached the Supreme 
Court almost certainly played a role in the Court’s unwillingness to defer 
to executive claims that the prisoners there were beyond the protection of 
the law.144 Thus, the pressure brought to bear on the United States from 
civil society was distinctly transnational, and operated via a number of 
avenues outside the U.S. constitutional system altogether. This 
transnational element was a particularly important feature of civil 
society’s appeal to rule-of-law values after 9/11, given American 
citizens’ and politicians’ historic indifference to the denial of foreign 
nationals’ rights.145
Nevertheless, restoration of constitutional and human rights cannot 
be attributed merely to the fact that civil society mobilized in defense of 
liberty. Civil society mobilizes around many issues, and as often as not it 
is unable to make much, if any, headway. Think, for example, of global 
warming or campaign finance reform. Moreover, civil society was 
arrayed on both sides of the fault lines. The American Enterprise 
Institute, the Federalist Society, Fox News, the Wall Street Journal, and 
other conservative voices pushed security interests over rights concerns, 
especially when the concerns were the rights of “the enemy.” Much of 
the media supported the drumbeat for war that preceded the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq. That the criticisms leveled by constitutional and human 
rights groups were as effective as they were may attest to the residual 
power in American culture of the ideals they advocated—liberty, 
equality, fair process, and dignity. Those values were strong enough, 
when pressed by a range of voices, to restrain the highest officials of the 
most powerful country in the world, even without much support from 
Congress, the courts, or the public at large. Margaret Mead famously 
warned that one should “never underestimate the power of a few 
committed people to change the world.”
 By involving other nations, civil society 
organizations were able, at least in some circumstances, to overcome 
their own nation’s traditional indifference to the rights of “others.” 
146
  
 144. See Devins, supra note 28, at 500-03. 
 One should also never 
underestimate the power of concerted appeals to constitutional and 
human rights. The relative success of these claims implies that, the 
executive’s initial reactions notwithstanding, a fairly robust culture of 
respect for constitutional and rule-of-law values was available to be 
called upon and mobilized. Civil society institutions were critical both to 
 145. See generally DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS, supra note 90. 
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29, 2010) (quoting Mead), available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk.opinion/commentators/johann-hari/johann-hari-protest-
works-just-look-at-the-proof-2119310.html. 
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building and sustaining that culture in ordinary times and to reinforcing it 
in a period of crisis, when much of the rest of society would just as soon 
have ignored it. 
The relative robustness of a constitutional culture depends in large 
measure on the work of civil society. Constitutional rights are but words 
scribbled on paper absent the efforts of concerned individuals and groups 
to give them meaning. When the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional 
challenge to the internment of more than 110,000 people of Japanese 
descent in 1944,147 the Constitution on its face guaranteed equal 
protection of the laws, but in practice guaranteed no such thing. It took 
the sustained efforts of civil society groups, in particular the ACLU and 
several Asian American groups and lawyers, to lead, forty-four years 
later, to an official apology and the payment of reparations.148 As a 
result, by the time the Supreme Court took up the Rasul and Hamdi cases 
in 2004, Korematsu had been widely condemned.149 The Justices in 2004 
had to be worried about repeating the mistake the Court had made in 
Korematsu.150 To drive the point home, the Brennan Center for Justice, 
another civil society group, filed amicus briefs on behalf of Fred 
Korematsu in those cases.151
  
 147. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 214 (1944). 
 Thus, the sustained efforts of civil society 
created a legacy around the Japanese internment that almost certainly 
played a hand in 2004 as the Court was once again asked to defer blindly 
to executive claims about the need to detain without legal process. More 
broadly, efforts of constitutional rights and civil rights and liberties 
groups over the years prior to September 11 helped build a culture of 
commitment to constitutional rights, which they were then able to invoke 
to roll back executive encroachments on basic rights thereafter. 
 148. PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN 
INTERNMENT CASES (1993). Lawsuits succeeded in disclosing, among other things, that 
the Justice Department misled the Supreme Court about key facts involved in the case, in 
particular its ability to distinguish those who posed a danger from those who did not. 
Some of the convictions were vacated on that basis. Eventually, in 1988, Congress 
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officially apologized to the internees and paid reparations to them and their survivors.  
 149. See COLE, ENEMY ALIENS, supra note 90 at 99. 
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 151. See Amicus Brief for Fred Korematsu, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (No. 
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B. The Role of the Courts 
With few exceptions, the federal courts, including the Supreme 
Court, have historically deferred to the President on matters of national 
security in times of crisis.152 There are isolated exceptions, to be sure. In 
the Civil War, Chief Justice Roger Taney, sitting as a single federal 
circuit judge, declared President Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus 
unconstitutional.153 In the Korean War, the Court invalidated President 
Harry Truman’s seizure of steel mills.154 And near the end of the 
Vietnam War, the Court refused to block the New York Times’ 
publication of the Pentagon Papers.155 But these are exceptions to the 
rule of deference in times of crisis.156
After 9/11, however, the Supreme Court broke from its past record, 
repeatedly rejecting presidential claims to deference on national security 
matters while the war and the crisis was very much ongoing. The Court 
insisted that it was responsible for reviewing detentions during wartime, 
rejected claims that it must defer to the executive on who may be 
detained, ruled that Al Qaeda and Taliban detainees must be accorded 
Geneva Conventions protections, and, most extraordinarily, kept the 
courthouse door open for the Guantánamo detainees even after Congress 
and the President, acting together, had unequivocally sought to close it. 
These groundbreaking decisions were undeniably important, but it would 
be a mistake to attribute to the Court the lion’s share of the credit for 
checking the President’s legally dubious counterterrorism measures. The 
Court actually mandated very little, and as detailed above, the vast 
majority of the reforms adopted by the executive branch were not 
ordered by any court.
  
157
Two decisions—Rasul and Boumediene—addressed only whether 
Guantánamo detainees could be heard in court, and said nothing about 
the law that would apply once their claims were adjudicated.
 
158 Many 
district courts subsequently ruled that Guantánamo detainees should be 
released for lack of evidence.159
  
 152. See generally STONE, supra note 89; WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT 
ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (1998). 
 Thus far, however, the Obama 
administration has won every case that it has appealed to the D.C. 
 153. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861). 
 154. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 155. N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
 156. See David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual 
Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565 (2003). 
 157. See supra Part II.A. 
 158. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485; Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779. 
 159. See, e.g., Al Mutairi v. U.S., 644 F. Supp. 2d 78, 96 (D.D.C. 2009). 
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Circuit, and the Supreme Court has declined to exercise further 
review.160 Thus, in nearly ten years, not a single detainee has been 
released by an unappealable court order.161 And the D.C. Circuit has 
ruled that courts lack the power to order the release of detainees into the 
United States, meaning that where, as is often the case, the detainee 
cannot be returned to his native country, even an order that a detention is 
unlawful does not compel release.162
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that a U.S. citizen 
was entitled to due process upon being held as an “enemy combatant” 
was limited to U.S. citizens, and therefore did not, on its face, apply to 
the vast majority of detainees in the ongoing conflict.
 
163 Even as to 
citizens, the Court failed to specify the particular procedures due, and the 
administration avoided further court review by releasing Hamdi on the 
condition that he resettle in Saudi Arabia.164
The Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which declared 
President Bush’s military commissions illegal, rested on statutory 
grounds, and the Court expressly invited Congress to overrule it if it 
disagreed.
  
165 Congress promptly did just that, enacting the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, which authorized military trials while making 
only modest improvements over the procedures that President Bush had 
created unilaterally.166
At the same time, while these decisions may not have formally 
demanded much from the administration, their indirect and informal 
effects were significant. The mere fact that the Court granted certiorari in 
Rasul v. Bush prompted the administration to introduce a number of 
reforms at Guantánamo, including the provision of administrative 
hearings. The voting alignment in two decisions involving U.S. citizens 
held as enemy combatants suggested that a majority of the Court would 
deny the President the power to detain a citizen captured within the 
  
  
 160. Lyle Denniston, D.C. Circuit: Last Stop for Detainees?, SCOTUS BLOG (Mar. 9, 
2012 3:48 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/d-c-circuit-last-stop-for-detainees/. 
 161. Id. The administration has forgone appeals in some cases and released detainees, 
but given its record of success in the court of appeals, these releases were for all practical 
purposes a matter of choice, not truly legally compelled. Id. 
 162. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 163. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533. There have been only two U.S. citizens detained by the 
military in the conflict with Al Qaeda—Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla. Id. at 577 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). 
 164. See Jerry Markon, Hamdi Returned to Saudi Arabia, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2004), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/artices/A23958-2004oct11.html. 
 165. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 594. 
 166. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006). 
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United States in a case properly before it.167 That prospect ultimately led 
President Bush to remove Jose Padilla, the only U.S. citizen in military 
custody captured in the United States, from military detention before his 
case reached the Supreme Court on the merits.168 The Court’s decision to 
extend habeas corpus review led the military to grant access to the 
military base to counsel for the detainees, and to grant those lawyers 
access to classified evidence regarding their clients subject to a 
protective order and security clearances.169 And the Court’s decision in 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the military commission case, impelled the military 
to countermand the President’s prior determination that Common Article 
3 of the Geneva Conventions did not protect Al Qaeda detainees.170 That 
determination, in turn, likely played a role in President Bush’s decision 
to move “high-value detainees” out of CIA black sites and into 
Guantánamo.171
While many scholars have stressed the minimalist character of the 
Supreme Court’s formal rulings,
 More broadly, all four cases rejected the Bush 
administration’s most extreme contention that as Commander-in-Chief, 
the President had the final word on how to “engage the enemy.” Thus, 
while the Court’s formal mandates were minimal, their informal and 
indirect effects were anything but. 
172
  
 167. In Padilla v. Rumsfeld, four Justices suggested in dissent that the President lacked 
such power, but the five-Justice majority dismissed the challenge because Padilla’s 
lawyers had filed in the wrong court. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 426, 461-62 (2004) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, who joined the majority’s jurisdictional holding 
in Padilla, had taken the position in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that the President lacked power 
to impose military detention on a U.S. citizen captured abroad. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554. 
Hence, there appeared to be five votes against military detention for U.S. citizens 
captured in the United States. 
 few have noted the prodigious 
amount of doctrinal work the Court had to do to rule against the 
President. The results in these cases were far from foregone conclusions. 
The sheer effort necessary to reach the Court’s results suggests that 
doctrine did not “control” here, and that therefore some informal force 
beyond legal doctrine was at play even in the most formal of the Bush 
administration’s legal defeats. In each of the three Guantánamo cases, for 
 168. Eric Lichtblau, In Legal Shift, U.S. Charges Detainee in Terrorism Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 23, 2005, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/23/national/nationalspecial3/23terror.html. 
 169. See Brendan M. Driscoll, The Guantánamo Protective Order, 30 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 873, 887 (2006). 
 170. Memorandum from Gordon England to the Secretaries of the Military 
Departments, et al. (July 7, 2006), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/dod/geneva070606.pdf. 
 171. See President Bush’s Speech on Terrorism (Sept. 6, 2006), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/06/washington/06bush_transcript.html?pagewanted=all 
 172. See sources cited supra note 28. 
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example, precedent seemed to favor the executive branch. In Johnson v. 
Eisentrager, the Court in 1950 had ruled that habeas corpus review was 
not available to “enemy aliens” held in a U.S. military prison outside our 
borders.173 The statute at issue in Rasul v. Bush was the very same statute 
at issue in Eisentrager.174 The Rasul Court nonetheless maintained that a 
subsequent judicial interpretation of that statute made habeas review 
available.175 But as Justice Scalia argued in dissent, that conclusion was 
in no way dictated by the intervening case, Braden v. 30th Judicial 
Circuit Court of Kentucky,176 which involved the quite distinct domestic 
issue of where a habeas petition should be filed when one state is 
detaining a prisoner at the behest of another state.177 Braden held that 
habeas could be filed in the district where the detaining authority was 
located, but it did not even mention, much less overrule, Eisentrager. 
Moreover, the Court in Rasul arrived at this argument largely on its own; 
the petitioners’ briefs in Rasul cited Braden only twice, both times only 
in passing, and both times in footnotes. 178
Johnson v. Eisentrager also appeared to support the executive in 
Boumediene, as it had denied habeas review of enemy detentions during 
war time, and had been interpreted by the Supreme Court subsequently 
as authority for the proposition that constitutional rights do not extend to 
non-citizens outside the United States’ borders.
 Yet the Court made Braden 
the linchpin of its decision. 
179 Another World War II 
precedent, Ex parte Quirin,180 seemed to support the President’s position 
in Hamdan, as it had upheld the President’s authority to try “enemy 
aliens” for war crimes in military commissions created by presidential 
order.181 In fact, President Bush’s order creating the military tribunal 
before which Hamdan was to have been tried was modeled directly on 
the President Roosevelt order upheld in Quirin.182
  
 173. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 781 (1950). 
 To rule against the 
 174. Id.; Rasul, 542 U.S. at 467. 
 175. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478. 
 176. 410 U.S. 484 (1973). 
 177. Id. at 493. 
 178. See Brief for Petitioner at 12 n.8, 38 n.41, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) 
(No. 03-334). 
 179. See, e.g., U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 250, 269 (1990); cf. Landon v. 
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982). 
 180. 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
 181. Id. at 597. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (citing Eisentrager 
for proposition that “[i]t is well established that certain constitutional protections 
available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our 
geographic borders”). 
 182. Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What 
a Difference Sixty Years Makes, UNIV. OF CHICAGO JOHN M. OLIN LAW AND ECONOMICS 
 
1236 THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57: 1203 
President was far from impossible in light of these precedents; none was 
squarely on point, and constitutional, statutory, and international law had 
evolved in the intervening fifty years. But considered purely in doctrinal 
terms, it would have been much easier to affirm the President’s actions. 
In addition, the legal standards that proved dispositive in Hamdan 
and Boumediene, arguably the Court’s two most significant decisions, 
were extremely open-ended. Both ultimately turned on questions of 
“practicability,” an intensely pragmatic assessment that one might 
predict would favor deference to the executive, not a judicial line in the 
sand. In Hamdan, the Court ruled that the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice authorized military commissions, but required that they conform 
to the process available in a court-martial unless those procedures would 
be “impracticable.”183 In Boumediene, the Court ruled that habeas corpus 
would extend to Guantánamo only if it were neither “impracticable” nor 
“anomalous” to do so.184
Similarly, the Court appeared to reach out almost on its own 
initiative to address the important Geneva Conventions issue in Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld.
 Considerations of “practicability” are not the 
kind of bright lines that one might expect courts to feel obligated (or 
emboldened) to enforce against the political branches on matters of 
national security. They call for pragmatic, all-things-considered 
judgments that courts might consider the executive better suited to make, 
especially in wartime. Had the Court wanted to defer, the law plainly 
permitted it to do so. Yet the Court rejected the President’s claims on just 
these “practicability” grounds. The fact that these results were in no way 
foreordained by legal precedent, and that if anything legal precedent 
pointed in the opposite direction, suggests that the Court was driven by 
something other than the pure force of legal doctrine. 
185 Once the Court concluded that the military commission 
procedures unjustifiably departed from the procedures established for 
courts-martial, it had a sufficient basis to rule for Hamdan.186
  
WORKING PAPER No. 153 (2d series), available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/153.jg-cs.tribunals.pdf . 
 It need not 
have reached the independent ground that the commissions violated the 
laws of war. And again, the Court did so virtually on its own. Petitioner 
barely pressed the issue, relegating discussion of Common Article 3 to 
the last three pages of his fifty-page principal brief, and did not even 
argue that the conflict with Al Qaeda was a non-international armed 
 183. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 622. 
 184. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770. 
 185. 548 U.S. 557, 626-27. 
 186. Id. at 559. 
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conflict, the linchpin of the Supreme Court’s reasoning.187 Yet in what 
ultimately proved to be the Court’s most important holding, the Court 
concluded that the conflict was indeed a non-international armed conflict 
governed by Common Article 3, and that the military commission 
procedures violated that provision, as it was incorporated into the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice.188 This ruling had implications far 
beyond military commissions, because Common Article 3 also prohibits 
any humiliating or cruel treatment of detainees, and at the time any 
violation of Common Article 3 was a war crime under the federal war 
crimes statute.189 This meant that the Bush administration’s “enhanced 
interrogation techniques” were criminal even if they did not amount to 
torture, as Common Article 3 prohibits both “cruel treatment” and 
“humiliating or degrading treatment.”190
It might be objected that doctrine rarely determines results at the 
Supreme Court level, where there are often splits in the circuit courts and 
reasonable arguments to be made on both sides of the dispute. In the 
Guantánamo cases, however, there were no splits in the circuits; the 
cases came up from the D.C. Circuit, which had consistently and 
unanimously ruled for the President—even after being reversed by the 
Supreme Court.
  
191 In any event, the role of external influences is surely 
more significant where the Court departs from precedent—consider, for 
example, the political and economic forces at play when, with the 
“switch in time that saved nine,” the Supreme Court broke with its 
previous Commerce Clause and Due Process jurisprudence and began to 
uphold New Deal statutes;192
  
 187. See Brief for Petitioner at 48-50, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 
05-184), available at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/05-184/05-
184.mer.pet.pdf.  
 the role of the civil rights movement and 
Cold War politics in the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of 
 188. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631. 
 189. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2005). After the Supreme Court ruled in Hamdan, Congress 
amended the war crimes statute to provide that only certain violations of Common Article 
3 are war crimes, and made its reforms retroactive, evidently out of concern that 
otherwise many U.S. officials would have been guilty of war crimes. Pub. L. No. 109-
366, § 6(b)(1), 120 Stat. 2633 (2006) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2441). 
 190. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,75 U.N.T.S. 135, available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/y3gctpw.htm. 
 191. Denniston, supra note 160. 
 192. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding Washington’s 
minimum wage law); see also Quinn Ho, Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 1, 2 (2010), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Switch.pdf (“The 
prevailing popular, but contested, account of the ‘switch in time that saved nine’ begins 
with a Court of four stalwart conservatives who battled with three liberal ‘musketeers’ for 
the survival of the New Deal.”). 
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Education193 to overturn Plessy v. Ferguson’s doctrine of “separate but 
equal,”194 or the role of the gay rights movement and changing social 
mores in the Court’s rejection of Bowers v. Hardwick195 in Lawrence v. 
Texas, which held a Texas law criminalizing homosexual sodomy 
unconstitutional.196 The Court’s military detention and trial cases did not 
directly overrule any precedents, but their general purport departed 
substantially from the Court’s historical deference to executive claims of 
national security in times of crisis.197
Moreover, the Court that ruled four times against the President was a 
distinctly conservative Court. It was largely the same Court that decided 
the 2000 election for George W. Bush by halting the recount in 
Florida.
 Thus, it is especially appropriate 
here, as in the New Deal, segregation, and sodomy cases, to look to 
influences beyond the law itself. 
198
What explains the decisions is not legal doctrine, but the Court’s 
choice to align itself with the rule of law against a narrative of 
lawlessness and “law-free zones.” At stake in each case was a claim that 
the executive’s actions were beyond the law’s reach. In each case, the 
Court resisted that claim, insisting, above all, that constitutional, 
statutory, and/or international law have a role in regulating and 
constraining the nation’s response to the threat of terrorism. The question 
in Rasul and Boumediene was whether persons whom the President had 
sought to place beyond the law’s reach could bring law to bear on their 
detentions (and on the executive’s authority) by pursuing a writ of 
habeas corpus.
 It was not known for its protection of individual rights and 
liberties. Thus, the ideological makeup of the Court does not in any 
straightforward way account for its decision either. 
199 A similar threshold issue was presented in Hamdan, 
and once again the Court ruled that law, and the Court, have a role to 
play.200 The Hamdan Court’s holding that the conflict with Al Qaeda was 
a “non-international armed conflict” governed by Common Article 3 
similarly brought law to bear, by enforcing a baseline of legal human 
rights protections for all detainees.201
  
 193. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 In short, all three cases are best 
understood as demanding that the President’s “war on terror” must be 
subject to the rule of law.  
 194. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 195. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 196. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 197. Devins, supra note 28, at 500-03. 
 198. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 199. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 723; Rasul, 542 U.S. at 466. 
 200. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 612-13. 
 201. Id. at 631. 
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In Hamdi, the question of law versus lawlessness was less starkly 
put, but only slightly. By the time that case reached the Supreme Court, 
the Bush administration had conceded that a U.S. citizen held in military 
custody in the United States could file a writ of habeas corpus,202 and to 
that extent, all parties agreed that Hamdi’s detention was subject to 
judicial review. But here, too, the administration argued that for all 
intents and purposes, the President was the judge of his own actions.203 
The Solicitor General argued that the President’s Article II authority as 
Commander-in-Chief permitted him to detain U.S. citizens without any 
statutory authorization, and even that a legislative restriction on that 
authority might be unconstitutional.204 And he maintained that the 
reviewing court must uphold the detention as long as the government 
provided “some evidence” that the individual fell into the category of an 
“enemy combatant,” and argued that a two-page affidavit based 
exclusively on hearsay was sufficient to meet that burden.205 In the 
administration’s view, there was no place for any sort of judicial inquiry 
into the truth of its assertions; the executive’s word would have to be 
taken as true. The Court declined to accept these arguments. It concluded 
that Congress had authorized detention of persons captured on the 
battlefield fighting for the Taliban, and therefore did not need to reach 
the president’s Article II arguments.206 And it held that due process 
required notice, a meaningful opportunity to respond, and a neutral trier 
of fact.207
Beyond the military detention and trial cases, however, the 
judiciary’s record is largely consistent with its traditionally deferential 
approach. In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Court in 2010 
ruled that Congress could constitutionally make it a crime to advocate for 
peace and human rights where Congress characterized doing so as 
“material support” to a group the administration had labeled terrorist.
 In short, in all four cases, the Court insisted that law must 
govern the detention and trial of those accused of being “the enemy,” and 
rejected arguments made by the President that, formally or practically, 
his actions were unconstrained by law. 
208 
As discussed in more detail in Part IV,209
  
 202. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510. 
 the Court recognized that the 
 203. Id. at 508. 
 204. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 2, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 
03-6696). 
 205. Id. at 9-10. 
 206. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536. 
 207. Id. at 536-39. 
 208. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2707 (2010). 
 209. See infra notes 323-28 and accompanying text. 
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statute penalized speech on the basis of its content,210 but failed to 
require the government to demonstrate that the law was narrowly tailored 
to further compelling ends, the usual burden in such circumstances. 
Instead, in the name of deference to the political branches’ judgments on 
national security and foreign relations judgments, the Court advanced its 
own speculative justifications—justifications that the government itself 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
upheld the law based on these untested speculations.211
The Court also dismissed two suits against Attorney General John 
Ashcroft arising out of his authorization of widespread preventive 
detention after September 11—one for mistreatment of persons detained 
in connection with the September 11 investigation, on grounds that the 
plaintiffs had insufficiently pleaded facts establishing Ashcroft’s 
personal responsibility;
  
212 and the other for abuse of the “material 
witness” statute to lock up a Muslim man without probable cause, on 
grounds of qualified immunity.213
The Court has declined to review many cases in which the lower 
courts have been extremely deferential to national security assertions 
despite disturbing allegations of constitutional abuses. Several courts of 
appeals have dismissed suits seeking damages for torture victims, on 
grounds of the “state secrets” privilege, qualified immunity, or the 
treatment of national security as a “special factor” militating against 
recognition of a Bivens remedy.
 
214
  
 210. 130 S. Ct. at 2720. 
 The Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit upheld the deportation of a foreign national for providing 
“material support” to organizations labeled terrorist even where the 
support consisted of providing a prayer tent and some food during a 
religious service that was attended by some members of a guerrilla 
 211. Id. at 2731. For detailed critiques of the Court’s analysis, see David Cole, The 
First Amendment’s Borders: The Place of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project in First 
Amendment Doctrine, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 147 (2012); Owen Fiss, The World We 
Live In, 83 TEMPLE L. REV. 295, 299-300 (2011). 
 212. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-51 (2009). 
 213. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011). 
 214. Mohammed v. Jeppeson Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) 
(dismissing damages case against independent contractor who provided flights for CIA 
renditions, on “state secrets” grounds), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011); Arar v. 
Ashcroft, 585 F.3d. 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (dismissing because national security 
and foreign relations raise “special factors” counseling against recognizing Bivens 
remedy for torture), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010); Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 
(D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2010); El Masri v. U.S., 479 F.3d 296 
(4th Cir.) (dismissing damages action for rendition and torture on state secrets grounds), 
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 947 (2007). But see Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 
2011). 
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group.215 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dismissed for lack of 
standing a challenge to the NSA warrantless wiretapping program 
because the plaintiffs could not prove that they were subjected to the 
program, all of whose targets were secret.216 The D.C. Circuit permitted 
the government to keep secret the identities of hundreds of foreign 
nationals it had subjected to preventive detention in the United States 
after September 11, even though none was found to be a terrorist.217 The 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the pretextual use of 
immigration authority to detain foreign nationals after September 11, 
even where the individuals had agreed to leave the country, thereby 
vitiating any immigration purpose for their detention.218 The same court 
upheld the Border Patrol’s authority to detain and interrogate several 
Muslim citizens who had attended a religious conference in Toronto.219 
Several courts of appeals upheld the freezing of assets of U.S. charities 
denominated as “terrorist,” without a warrant or probable cause, without 
notice of the charges, and largely on the basis of secret 
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????? ????????????????220
Thus, aside from the Supreme Court’s threshold decisions in the 
“enemy combatant” cases, the judiciary has done relatively little, at least 
as a formal matter, to compel the administration to change course after 
September 11. Most of the administration’s adjustments were made 
without being ordered by a court to do anything. The courts were not the 
moving force in the taming of the United States’ most aggressive post-
9/11 security measures. 
 
And as noted above, the D.C. Circuit has consistently ruled for the 
government in Guantánamo habeas appeals, and the Supreme Court has 
thus far turned down all petitions to review those decisions. 
  
 215. Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293, 299 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 216. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 662-64 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. 
denied, 552 U.S. 1179 (2008). 
 217. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 218. Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 589 F.3d 542 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 219. Tabaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 220. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003); 
Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002); but cf. Al Haramain 
Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 660 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding 
that the Treasury Department violated the Fourth Amendment by freezing designated 
entity’s assets without a warrant, violated the Fifth Amendment by relying on classified 
evidence and failing to provide adequate notice and an opportunity to respond; and 
violated the First Amendment by barring coordinated advocacy with the designated 
group); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 2d 
857 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (holding that freezing an entity’s assets pending investigation on 
classified evidence and without a warrant violated the entity’s Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment rights). 
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C. The Role of Congress 
Congress did even less than the courts to protect rights in the wake of 
September 11. 221 It passed the USA Patrio Act222 shortly after the 
attacks, and while it did not give the President all that he asked for, the 
Act expanded his authority to conduct surveillance, gather intelligence, 
detain and deport foreign nationals on grounds of political association 
and belief, and freeze assets based on secret evidence, while relaxing 
judicial oversight and other constraints on these powers.223 As noted 
above, when the Supreme Court declared the President’s military 
commissions illegal, Congress made them legal by authorizing them in 
the Military Commissions Act of 2006.224 When the Court held that the 
habeas corpus statute extended to persons held without charge at 
Guantánamo, Congress repealed that portion of the statute in the 
Detainee Treatment Act.225 It granted retroactive immunity to 
telecommunications service providers who, at the executive’s request, 
engaged in illegal warrantless electronic surveillance.226 And Congress 
has repeatedly obstructed President Obama’s efforts to close 
Guantánamo by barring the expenditure of any funds to transfer 
detainees to the United States, even to stand trial in a criminal court, and 
requiring certifications for any transfer to a foreign country that are so 
onerous that transfers ceased for fifteen months.227
  
 221. Congress did, of course, enact legislation before September 11 that provided some 
protections for liberty and privacy that continued thereafter, such as the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812 (2010). However, it watered down 
many of those protections in the USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 
272 (2001), and, apart from the McCain Amendment to the Detainee Treatment Act, Pub. 
L. No. 109-148, § 1003, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739-40, adopted no affirmative legislation to 
restrict the President’s initiatives. 
 
 222. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
 223. Id. See generally DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 249-
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 226. 50 U.S.C. § 1885 (2006). 
 227. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, H.R. 1540, 112th 
Cong. § 1021 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
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Detainees Freed, the First in 15 Months, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/20/world/americas/2-guantanamo-bay-detainees-freed-
in-el-salvador.html; David Cole, Gitmo Forever? Congress’s Dangerous New Bill, N.Y. 
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http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2011/dec/08/gitmo-forever-dangerous-new-bill/; 
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The one exception to Congress’ otherwise abject deference was its 
reaffirmation, in the “McCain Amendment” to the Detainee Treatment 
Act, that the prohibition on cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment 
found in the Convention Against Torture (CAT) applied to all persons 
held by U.S. authorities, anywhere in the world, regardless of their 
nationality.228 This provision, enacted over vigorous opposition 
personally directed by Vice-President Richard Cheney, repudiated the 
Bush administration’s contention that the CAT prohibition did not apply 
to foreign nationals held outside the United States.229 That theory, 
counter to the text and spirit of the CAT,230 was driven by the 
administration’s desire to inflict cruel and inhuman treatment on terror 
suspects, especially in the CIA’s secret prisons.231 In the McCain 
Amendment, Congress reaffirmed that this human rights protection 
applied equally to all human beings, whatever their nationality and 
wherever they are held.232 However, Congress provided no mechanism 
for enforcing the provision.233 Moreover, foreseeing that it might lose the 
vote in Congress on the issue, the administration had already prepared a 
secret legal memorandum concluding that none of its “enhanced 
interrogation techniques” were in fact cruel, inhuman, or degrading in 
violation of CAT, even when inflicted in combination.234
Thus, the legislature has, if anything, proved a source of law 
violations and abuse, and has provided little or no enforceable check on 
executive overreaching. 
 
D. The Role of Politics 
The force of ordinary electoral politics also cannot account for the 
shift in U.S. counterterrorism policy. None of the Bush administration’s 
initial initiatives sparked majoritarian opposition. To the contrary, 
  
David Cole, A Bill of Rights for Some, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Dec. 16, 2011), available at 
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 229. David Cole, Who They Are, SLATE (Nov. 11, 2009), available at 
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 230. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32890, RENDITIONS: 
CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY LAWS ON TORTURE 8 (2009). 
 231. Cole, supra note 229. 
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 234. U.S. Justice Dep’t, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, 
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President Bush, who had very low approval ratings shortly before 9/11, 
shot up in popularity when he declared the “war on terror,” and was re-
elected in 2004, in large measure on his promise to deliver security.235 
Apart from opposition to the war in Iraq, there was little widespread 
popular pressure on President Bush to rein in his security initiatives. 
Despite this evidence, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have argued 
that in the modern era, political checks are all there are when it comes to 
restraining executive power. 236 They maintain that Congress, the courts, 
and the law itself cannot effectively constrain the executive, especially in 
emergencies, but that this need not concern us because the executive is 
adequately limited by political forces. At first blush, the past decade 
might appear to vindicate Posner and Vermeule’s views, as political 
forces, broadly speaking, seem to have been at least as effective at 
checking the President as were Congress or the judiciary.237
Posner and Vermeule contend that the separation of powers is, for all 
practical purposes, defunct, as executive power has dramatically 
expanded relative to the other branches in the modern era.
 But there is 
in fact little evidence that electoral politics or majoritarian sentiment 
played much, if any, role in persuading President Bush to ratchet back 
his security initiatives. While formal judicial and legislative checks 
cannot tell the whole story, the alternative account is not “politics” as 
Posner and Vermeule define and describe it, but a much more complex 
interplay of civil society, law, politics, and culture: what I have called 
“civil society constitutionalism.” 
238 Like many 
commentators before them, Posner and Vermeule attribute this 
development to the growth of the administrative state239 and to the near-
constant state of emergency in which modern American government now 
seems to operate.240 But where other commentators view these 
developments as profound challenges to our constitutional order, Posner 
and Vermeule insist that ordinary political constraints on the executive 
are sufficient.241
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In my view, Posner and Vermeule simultaneously underestimate the 
constraining force of law and overestimate the influence of political 
limits on executive overreaching. Sounding like Critical Legal Studies 
adherents, they sweepingly claim that law is so indeterminate and 
manipulable as to constitute only a “façade of lawfulness.”242 But in 
assessing law’s effect, they look almost exclusively to formal indicia—
statutes and court decisions.243 That approach disregards the role that law 
plays without coming to a head in a judicial decision or legislative act. 
As the post-9/11 period illustrates, when law is reinforced and defended 
by civil society institutions, it can have a disciplining function long 
before cases reach final judgment, and even when no case is ever filed, a 
reality to which anyone who has worked in the executive branch will 
attest.244
While they are overly skeptical about law, Posner and Vermeule are 
unrealistically romantic about the constraining force of majoritarian 
politics. The political checks they identify consist solely of the fact that 
Presidents must worry about election returns, and must cultivate 
 Executive officials generally cannot know in advance whether 
their actions will attract the attention of civil society watchdogs, or lead 
to court review. They often cannot know whether such oversight—
whether by a court, a legislative committee, or a nongovernmental 
organization—will be strict or deferential. As long as there is some risk 
of such oversight, the resultant uncertainty itself is likely to have a 
disciplining effect on the choices they make. There are, in short, plenty 
of reasons why executive lawyers generally take legal limits seriously. 
They take an oath and are acculturated to do so. They know that claims 
of illegality can undermine their objectives. And they cannot predict 
when a legal claim will be advanced against them. Similarly, in focusing 
exclusively on statutes and their enforcement by courts, Posner and 
Vermeule disregard the considerable checking function that Congress’s 
legal oversight role plays through means short of formal statutes, such as 
by holding hearings, launching investigations, requesting information 
about doubtful executive practices, or restricting federal expenditures. 
The effectiveness of these checks, moreover, will often turn on the 
strength of civil society. If there are significant watchdogs in the 
nongovernmental sector and/or the media focused on executive actions, 
ready to bring allegedly illegal conduct to public attention, the law will 
have substantial deterrent effect, with or without actual court decisions. 
  
 242. Id. at 90. 
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 244. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 102 (2007) (arguing that the executive’s national security function 
is excessively governed by law). 
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credibility and trust among the electorate.245
First, and most fundamentally, while the democratic process is well 
designed to protect the majority’s rights and interests, it is poorly 
designed to protect the rights of minorities, and not designed at all to 
protect the rights of foreign nationals, who have no say in the political 
process.
 There are several reasons to 
doubt that these political realities are sufficient to guard against 
executive overreaching. 
246 In times of crisis, the executive nearly always selectively 
sacrifices the rights of foreign nationals, often defending its actions by 
claiming that “they” do  not deserve the same rights that “we” do.247
Second, the ability of the political process to police the executive is 
hampered by secrecy. Much of what the executive does, especially in 
times of crisis, is secret, and even when some aspects of executive action 
are public, its justifications often rest on grounds that are assertedly 
secret.
 To 
say the law is superfluous because we have elections is to relegate 
foreign nationals, and minorities generally, to largely unchecked abuse. 
248 Courts and Congress have at least some ability to pierce that 
veil and to insist on accountability. Absent legal rights, such as those 
created by the Freedom of Information Act, the general public has 
virtually no ability to do so.249
Third, the electoral process is a blunt-edged sword. Presidential 
elections occur only once every four years, and congressional elections 
every two years. Congressional elections will often involve an 
unpredictable mix of local and national matters, and there is little reason 
to believe they will concentrate on executive overreaching. Presidential 
elections also inevitably encompass a broad range of issues, most of 
which will have nothing to do with security and liberty. Elections are 
therefore unlikely to be effective at addressing specific abuses of power. 
Voters’ concerns about abstract institutional issues such as executive 
power may clash with their interests on the substantive merits of 
particular issues, such as whether to use military force in support of 
Libyan rebels. There is no guarantee that citizens will separate these 
issues in their minds, and no reason to believe that if they do so, they will 
favor abstract institutional concerns over specific policy preferences at 
the ballot box. 
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Fourth, the political process is notoriously focused on the short term, 
while constitutional rights and separation of powers generally serve long-
term values.250 It was precisely because ordinary politics tend to be 
shortsighted that the framers adopted a constitutional democracy. The 
Constitution identifies those values that society understands as important 
to preserve for the long term, but knows it will be tempted to sacrifice in 
the short term.251
Thus, there is little evidence in fact that majoritarian politics played a 
significant checking role in the aftermath of 9/11, or that such politics 
would generally be a sufficient checking force in times of crisis. And 
more generally, there is little reason to believe that political checks will 
be sufficient to restrain presidential abuse. The story is infinitely more 
complicated. As I have sought to illustrate here, in the aftermath of 9/11, 
the interplay of law, politics, and culture, framed and prompted by civil 
society organizations, was critical to rendering effective constitutional 
and international legal checks. 
 If ordinary politics were sufficient to protect such 
values, we would not need a constitution in the first place. 
E. Alternative Accounts 
In the preceding sections, I have sought to show that the curtailments 
of President Bush’s initial counterterrorism initiatives cannot be 
attributed to the formal checks and balances of judicial review or 
legislation, or to majoritarian political forces, and that as a general rule, 
these sources are unlikely to impose significant checks during times of 
crisis. What checks there were, I suggest, seem to have been driven in 
significant part by nongovernmental institutions—in particular, civil 
society groups devoted to constitutional and human rights. There are, to 
be sure, alternative accounts of the first post-9/11 decade. In this section, 
I argue that while some of these alternative accounts may tell part of the 
story, they do not convincingly rule out the significant role that civil 
society has played.  
1.  Continuity, Not Change 
Some have argued that the real story is not the restoration of rights 
and legality, but the institutionalization of “the state of the exception.”252
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Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2317 (2006). 
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According to this view, Obama has largely continued the Bush 
initiatives, rendering them, if anything, more resistant to challenge 
because they are now cloaked in the legitimacy of an administration 
perceived as more sensitive to civil rights and civil liberties.253 This view 
is articulated by advocates on the left who are disappointed that Obama 
has not made more substantial changes, and by advocates on the right 
who point to Obama’s actions as evidence that Bush’s policies were not 
as extreme as many critics portrayed them.254
The principal difference between the Bush and Obama 
administrations lies in their attitudes toward domestic and international 
legal constraints. Bush viewed the law in Schmittian terms as secondary, 
with security his only real mandate.
 This account, however, 
unfairly discounts the significant changes that have been made since the 
first two years after 9/11, and especially since Obama took office. 
255 Accordingly, his administration 
did all it could to avoid legal dictates, reading some laws (such as the 
Geneva Conventions, the Non-Detention Act, and the prohibition on 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment) as inapplicable altogether; 
implausibly interpreting other laws (such as the bans on torture and 
warrantless wiretapping) as not encompassing conduct they were plainly 
meant to prohibit; and asserting the President’s authority to disregard and 
override any contrary law by virtue of his alleged Article II authority as 
Commander in Chief.256 President Obama, by contrast, has insisted from 
the outset that he will fight terrorism within and pursuant to the rule of 
law, and that the nation will be stronger for doing so.257
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 As noted above, 
he even argued in the D.C. Circuit that the court had erroneously granted 
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him too much power, when a panel of that court ruled that Guantánamo 
detentions need not be cabined by the laws of war.258
From the left, the criticism that Obama is no different from Bush 
seems largely to stem from frustration that he has not ended the practices 
of military detention, military commissions, and targeted killing.
 
259 For 
example, with respect to Guantánamo, the mantra of many in the human 
rights community has been “try or release;” they argue that if terrorists 
cannot be convicted in an ordinary civilian criminal court, they should be 
released.260 Terrorists should be apprehended and brought to trial, they 
maintain, not assassinated by drones.261 But these critiques tend to ignore 
that we are in an ongoing armed conflict, where military detention, 
military justice, and killing itself are not per se violations of international 
law, international human rights, or domestic law.262 On the contrary, all 
are customary elements of a nation’s arsenal when it is at war.263 The 
United States is still engaged in an armed conflict in Afghanistan and the 
border regions of Pakistan with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and 
accordingly has authority to kill or hold in military detention people 
fighting for the other side, as well as to use military criminal process to 
try them for war crimes. There is of course substantial room for debate 
about the proper scope of the authority to kill, detain, and/or try in the 
military system, but the notion that there is no authority for such 
measures finds little support in precedent or international law.264
Many complaints about President Obama’s measures assume that the 
appropriate benchmark for assessment is the peacetime approach that 
prevailed before the attacks of September 11; from that perspective, we 
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have “established a new normal,” as the ACLU and others have 
maintained.265
In short, while problems undoubtedly remain, it can hardly be denied 
that a nation not engaged in torture, renditions, disappearances, detention 
without hearings or judicial review, and warrantless wiretapping is more 
consistent with rule-of-law principles than one that is so engaged. 
 But if one accepts that there is an ongoing, armed conflict 
with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, centered in Afghanistan, the appropriate 
lens is not peace, but war. And from that perspective, there are 
significant differences between President Bush’s initial measures and 
those that the United States is now employing. 
2.  The Pendulum Effect 
A second alternative account acknowledges that meaningful reforms 
have been made, but maintains that such corrections are inevitable when 
the moment of crisis passes, and that all we have seen in the last decade 
is a regression to the mean.266
The pendulum does not swing of its own accord; there is no 
analogical force to gravity involved. After all, as another common 
observation has it, government officials who gain expanded powers in 
periods of crisis are loath to surrender it thereafter. It takes opposition, 
criticism, and dissent to create momentum for society and the 
government to move in the other direction. This is especially so given the 
weight of the forces arrayed on the side of overreaction. The power of 
fear, the sheer size of the national-security-industrial complex, and the 
fact that by and large the rights sacrificed have been of foreign nationals 
combine to create extraordinary pressure in favor of overreaching, and 
none of these elements produces a corrective of its own accord. Even if 
some pendulum effect is likely, the vigor of opposition and dissent 
 It is certainly true as a historical matter 
that governments often overreact in the heat of a crisis, and that once the 
crisis cools, calmer heads more often prevail. In the heat of the moment, 
we are likely to panic and overestimate what is appropriate or necessary 
to address the threat. As time passes and fear subsides, there may well be 
more room for rationality to return. But this account, often depicted as 
the swing of a pendulum, is too thin, and risks complacency to the extent 
that it portrays the shift as almost automatic.  
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voiced by civil society may well determine both the extent of the initial 
overreaction and the speed with which corrections are made.267
3. Judicial Self-Interest 
  
A third account focuses on the Supreme Court’s role in particular, 
and characterizes its interventions as driven largely, if not exclusively, by 
concern for its own power, and not for liberty or human rights.268
Moreover, this account is not persuasive even as an explanation of 
the Court’s own role. The same institutional self-interest in judicial 
power presumably existed in other crises; yet, before the post-September 
11 cases, the Supreme Court had almost uniformly deferred to claims of 
executive prerogative on issues of national security in times of crisis.
 
However, this explanation, even if one were to accept it on its own terms 
as a rationale for the Court’s conduct, addresses only a small part of the 
picture. As discussed above, most of the reforms were undertaken 
without an order from the Supreme Court.  
269 
Apart from the steel seizure and Pentagon Papers cases,270 this was the 
first time the Court intervened to restrain a President during wartime. In 
World War I, World War II, and during the height of the Cold War, the 
Court remained on the sidelines or deferred to questionable assertions of 
national security needs.271 Only when those conflicts came to an end did 
the Court assert itself.272
Indeed, a court concerned about conserving its own institutional 
power might be more likely to defer during times of crisis. One cannot be 
certain how the public will respond to a decision. Ruling for “the enemy” 
during wartime could be a risky proposition. A court primarily concerned 
about maintaining its institutional capital might therefore make the 
strategic choice to defer in times of crisis so as to avoid showdowns that 
could undermine its legitimacy, thereby preserving its power for ordinary 
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times.273
Moreover, to the extent that the Supreme Court in the combatant 
cases viewed its choice as one of siding with law or lawlessness, as I 
have suggested above,
 Accordingly, it is not obvious that the Supreme Court’s own 
institutional interests in times of crisis push it in the direction of 
intervention, rather than deference or avoidance. 
274
4. The Iraq War 
 that seems likely to be the result of the 
successful framing that civil society organizations were able to give 
those cases by the time they reached the Court. 
A fourth account points to the effect of the Iraq war in turning public 
opinion against the administration. The Bush administration’s insistence 
on pursuing that costly and unpopular war, coupled with the absence of 
weapons of mass destruction there, the ostensible reason for invading, 
dramatically undermined the public’s trust in the administration. The 
presidency was much weaker after going to war with Iraq than before, 
and that weakness undoubtedly contributed to the success of broader 
reform efforts.275
Second, what made the Iraq war debacle particularly influential with 
respect to human rights and the “war on terror” was that the problems 
there echoed the broader problems that plagued the rest of the 
administration’s counterterrorism policies.
 But this explanation is insufficient standing alone. 
First, in the absence of pressure from civil society on issues of 
constitutional and human rights, there is no particular reason that the 
President’s weakness on Iraq would translate into strengthened human 
rights claims with respect to counterterrorism efforts more generally. On 
the contrary, it might conceivably have created further pressure for even 
more extreme measures, to “reassure” a questioning public. 
276 The Iraq war, like many of 
President Bush’s most questionable initiatives, was said to be driven by 
concern about terrorism.277 And as with the other national security 
initiatives surveyed above, the administration largely thrust law to the 
side with respect to the Iraq war.278
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response to armed attack.279 Many experts interpret international law to 
permit in addition a unilateral act of self-defense against an imminent, 
but not yet launched, attack.280 In the case of Iraq, however, the United 
States faced neither. Yet the administration went to war anyway, without 
approval from the U.N. Security Council.281
The Iraq war, like Bush’s counterterrorism policy more generally, 
featured a willingness to use the state’s most coercive authority to 
“prevent” speculative future attacks, in disregard of fundamental legal 
constraints, and on the basis of shoddy evidence.
  
282 The revelations of 
torture at Abu Ghraib prison, closely linked to the administration’s 
coercive interrogation practices at Guantánamo and elsewhere, 
dramatically reinforced the connections. In short, what was wrong with 
the Iraq war was also wrong with the administration’s preventive 
counterterrorism paradigm more generally.283
At a minimum, claims that there has been no meaningful resurrection 
of the rule of law, that all we have witnessed is the inevitable swing of a 
pendulum, that it is all a matter of judicial self-interest, and that the 
unpopularity of the Iraq war drove the reforms, cannot fully account for 
what happened in the first post-9/11 decade. Even if some of these 
perspectives illuminate part of the story, a more complete account 
requires consideration of the influence of civil society. 
 But again, absent a strong 
foundation for the broader critique of Bush’s policies, the Iraq war 
fallout might not have contributed to the restoration of legality in U.S. 
counterterrorism policy more generally. 
IV. LESSONS OF THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 DECADE 
The lessons of the last decade suggest that if we are to resist 
executive overreaching in the future, developing and reinforcing a 
culture of resilience with respect to constitutional and human rights may 
be as important as the formal checks and balances enshrined in the 
Constitution, and civil society organizations have a unique role to play in 
fostering that culture and advancing those claims. This observation in 
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turn has implications for constitutional theory, law, and practice. First, as 
to theory, scholars and students of the Constitution would do well to pay 
as close attention to the rights-reinforcing and checking functions of civil 
society as they traditionally have to courts, Congress, and the formal 
separation of powers. Second, with respect to the content of 
constitutional law, the First Amendment freedoms of speech and 
association should be understood as essential to ensure that there is room 
for civil society organizations to operate. Vincent Blasi argued long ago 
that the First Amendment serves a critical function in checking 
government abuse;284
A. Theory: Civil Society Constitutionalism 
 but it is not the First Amendment itself, but the 
civil society that it protects, that actually does the checking. Third, and 
most importantly, as a matter of practice, the experience of the first post-
9/11 decade underscores the important value of our active engagement as 
citizens in civil society organizations dedicated to constitutional and 
human rights. Without that engagement, a constitution is likely to be as 
thin as the parchment on which it is written.  
If pressure from civil society contributed to the restoration of legality 
in the decade after September 11, it is essential for constitutional 
theorists to pay closer attention to how that pressure works, and in 
particular, to the effect of civil society on constitutionalism and human 
rights. I have argued above that the surprisingly robust post-9/11 checks 
on the executive branch can be attributed neither to law in the formal 
sense, nor to ordinary politics. One cannot understand the transformation 
without considering the role played by civil society groups committed to 
constitutional and human rights. Constitutional theory has traditionally 
looked to the Constitution itself and the separation of powers, especially 
judicial review, for the enforcement of legal limits on government power. 
But the post-9/11 experience suggests that a robust civil society 
dedicated to constitutional and human rights may be as important as the 
more formal elements of separation of powers in checking executive 
abuse. At the same time, there is a complex interrelationship between the 
informal power of civil society and more formal legal constraints. Legal 
disputes and claims provide the focal point of many of these groups’ 
activities, but their activities are by no means limited to seeking 
injunctive relief in court. They also invoke legal claims in the informal 
sphere of civil discourse, calling on government officials, elites, and the 
  
 284. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 AM. BAR 
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2012] WHERE LIBERTY LIES 1255 
population at large to adhere to the commitments reflected in the 
Constitution and human rights instruments. 
Some constitutional theorists have begun to criticize American 
constitutional law and scholarship for its near-exclusive focus on 
courts.285 They argue that courts are inherently conservative institutions 
with severely limited remedial capabilities, and that even when they 
happen to issue rights-protective decisions, those decisions may spark 
backlash that does more harm than good. At the same time, they 
maintain, excessive focus on courts as the enforcers of constitutional 
rights makes the other branches of government and the people at large 
less likely to take responsibility themselves to effectuate the 
Constitution. So-called “popular constitutionalism” argues that we must 
“take the Constitution away from the courts,” and empower and inspire 
“the people themselves” and/or their representatives to take on a more 
affirmative constitutional role.286
The focus on constitutionalism outside the courts builds upon an 
important truth; namely that, as Learned Hand noted in 1944, “liberty 
lies in the hearts of men and women.”
 
287 But popular constitutionalism’s 
prescription is flawed. The Constitution is designed to constrain us, in 
recognition that the people themselves and their representatives will be 
tempted to disregard long-term commitments to fundamental values 
when those values conflict (as they often will) with short-term popular 
preferences. To “take the Constitution away from the courts” and assign 
its enforcement to Congress, the President, or the people themselves, is 
to ask the fox to guard the henhouse. In a fundamental sense, then, 
“popular constitutionalism” is a contradiction in terms.288
In what they have termed “democratic constitutionalism,” Robert 
Post and Reva Siegel have sought to take the insights of “popular 
constitutionalism” seriously, but without discounting or denigrating the 
role of courts.
 
289
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enforcing constitutional protections against majoritarian pressures.290 But 
they also insist that the “authority of the Constitution depends on its 
democratic legitimacy, upon the Constitution’s ability to inspire 
Americans to recognize it as their Constitution.”291 As such, they see a 
role for both courts and the people, and argue that popular reactions to 
constitutional decisions, worryingly described by other scholars as 
“backlash,” should be viewed positively as expressing “the desire of a 
free people to influence the content of the Constitution.”292 As they put 
it, “[b]acklash can promote constitutional solidarity and invigorate the 
democratic legitimacy of constitutional interpretation.”293
Both “popular” and “democratic” constitutionalism recognize a 
central paradox of constitutional and human rights in a democracy: 
namely, that those rights are designed to check the force of popular 
opinion and ordinary politics, but, as Learned Hand noted, they are 
effective only to the extent that the people are committed to them. How 
does constitutional law check politics if it is ultimately dependent upon 
political commitment?  
 Thus, Post and 
Siegel seek to avoid the contradiction of “popular constitutionalism” by 
focusing instead on the interaction between popular political movements 
and judicial decisions about constitutional meaning. 
This article’s focus on the particular role played by civil society 
organizations committed to constitutional rights suggests an answer. 
Because such civil society organizations define themselves by their 
institutional dedication to rights, operate through appeals to rights, and 
lack the formal authority to “enforce” rights themselves, they necessarily 
bridge the gap between politics and constitutional law, by building, 
supporting, and reinforcing a culture of resilience with respect to 
constitutional and human rights.  
Civil society, in other words, performs an essential function in 
making rights meaningful, and in furthering Hand’s requirement that 
“liberty lies in the hearts of men and women.”294
  
 290. Id. 
 Much like a 
constitution itself, a civil society organization committed to 
constitutional or human rights represents a collective decision to defend 
certain fundamental values. Unlike a constitution, however, civil society 
is not simply a piece of paper, but a living embodiment of those 
commitments. And when, as in times of crisis, the executive, the 
legislature, the courts, and the general population are most inclined to 
 291. Id. at 374. 
 292. Id. at 376. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
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favor broad executive power over fidelity to fundamental principle, civil 
society organizations play their most critical role. Because those 
organizations are defined by their commitment to constitutional and 
human rights values, they are less likely to lose sight of those values in 
times of crisis.295
Indeed, these civil society organizations often thrive precisely when 
it appears that all other forces in society are directed toward undermining 
constitutional and human rights. Thus, the ACLU, the Center for 
Constitutional Rights, and the Council on American-Islamic Relations all 
grew substantially in the wake of 9/11, as supporters saw those 
institutions as critically important checks on government abuse and 
flocked to join and support them like never before.
 
296 And despite their 
lack of any governmental or similarly formalized power, they played an 
important role in prompting the United States to bring its counter-
terrorism policies and practices more in line with constitutional and 
human rights limits.297
Nor is the role of civil society organizations in formulating, shaping, 
and helping to enforce constitutional meaning limited to times of crisis. 
In future scholarship, I aim to examine the broader role that such groups 
play in giving rights meaning. But suffice it to note here that it is difficult 
to name a single advance in the development of constitutional rights that 
has not been prompted and accompanied by the active participation, and 
often, leadership, of civil society organizations. Civil society groups 
committed to eliminating racial injustice, including the NAACP, the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and a host of other civil rights groups, 
were critically important to the dismantling of official segregation and 
racial discrimination.
 
298 Women’s rights groups, including the ACLU 
under the guiding hand of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, played a central role in 
establishing the constitutional principle that distinctions based on sex are 
presumptively suspect under the Equal Protection Clause, and that the 
right to terminate a pregnancy is a central aspect of equality.299
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society groups dedicated to gay rights played an important part in the 
Supreme Court’s invalidation of homosexual sodomy laws in Lawrence 
v. Texas, as well as in the ongoing movement to recognize the right of 
same-sex couples to marry.300
Civil society organizations, of course, do not always push in 
progressive directions. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, for example, 
spends vast resources to press the rights of big business over the interests 
of consumers, workers, and the environment. The National Rifle 
Association and other gun rights groups, with substantial financial 
backing from the gun industry, successfully advocated to establish a right 
to bear arms that contributes to violent crime nationwide. Religious 
organizations have worked long and hard to roll back the protections the 
Supreme Court afforded pregnant women in Roe v. Wade. And so-called 
super PACs, also a part of “civil society,” have served to obscure the 
efforts of the super-rich to skew presidential and congressional elections 
through massive anonymous spending on campaign advertising. 
 Attempting to understand these 
developments either as a matter of pure doctrine, or as a function of 
politics writ large, misses the distinctive role that civil society 
organizations have played in formulating, developing, and enforcing 
constitutional rights claims. 
In fact, some of the most successful civil society ventures in the last 
two decades have been conservative, opposing affirmative action, 
universal health care, gay rights, and environmental regulation.301
Civil society constitutionalism, by focusing on the catalytic and 
reinforcing role of civil society organizations, helps to explain how 
constitutional and human rights values are effectuated and protected in a 
democracy. It is not “the people themselves,” an abstraction, but 
individuals acting together in specific nongovernmental organizations 
 
Moreover, for every New York Times editorial criticizing a national 
security initiative for violating civil liberties, the Wall Street Journal 
seems to run an editorial promoting a hard-line security position. Thus, 
there is no guarantee that civil society will help constitutional rights 
evolve in a progressive direction. My claim is rather that much of the 
work of constitutionalism will be done in the civil society sector, and that 
in order to understand how constitutions and the rights they guarantee 
actually work, scholars need to pay more attention to the role these 
nongovernmental institutions play in the struggle over constitutional 
meaning. 
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and associations, that play a critical role. Civil society organizations are 
at once committed to constitutional law and actually engaged in 
advancing that law. They bridge the gap between ordinary politics and 
formal constitutional law, and help to reinforce the culture that is so 
essential to preserving the Constitution as a living embodiment of our 
society’s deepest commitments. 
Like the popular constitutionalists, Joseph Margulies and Hope 
Metcalf criticize post-9/11 legal scholarship for focusing inordinately on 
the role of courts in protecting and preserving rights.302 In their view, 
whether rights are actualized turns less on formal judicial decisions than 
on which narrative prevails in American culture—one that sees rights 
(often, the rights of others) as obstacles to national security or one that 
sees respect for rights as an important component of American values 
and a source of strength.303 Court decisions and political elections play a 
part in the competing narratives, and those narratives in turn play a part 
in judicial decisions and elections, but there is no necessary 
correspondence. A judicial or electoral victory may reinforce one set of 
views or, conversely, prompt a backlash.304
It is important to distinguish the role of civil society from democratic 
politics more generally. As I have shown above,
 Margulies and Metcalf thus 
properly emphasize the need to consider the interrelation of law, culture, 
and politics. This essay maintains that civil society plays a critical role in 
affecting which narrative prevails; what results obtain in the courts, 
Congress, and the executive branch; and what responses those results are 
likely to engender. In short, we cannot understand the arc of 
constitutionalism without paying close attention to the work of civil 
society groups. 
305
  
 302. Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 252, at 437, 450. 
 while political forces 
played an important role in checking President Bush, what was 
significant was the particular substantive content of that politics; it was 
not just any political pressure, but pressure to maintain fidelity to 
constitutional and human rights. Politics standing alone is as likely to 
fuel as to deter abuse; consider the lynch mob in the United States or the 
Nazi Party in Germany. What we need if we are to check abuses of 
executive power is a culture that champions constitutional and human 
rights. And civil society groups sharing those commitments are integral 
 303. See id. at 456-70 (criticizing legalistic and court-centric understanding of rights, 
and advocating more attention to the political and symbolic uses of rights). 
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to building and sustaining that culture, and to invoking it in times of 
crisis. 
Unlike the majoritarian electoral politics Posner and Vermeule 
imagine, the work of civil society cannot be segregated neatly from the 
law. On the contrary, it will often coalesce around a distinctly legal 
challenge, objecting to departures from specific legal norms, often but 
not always heard in a court case, as with civil society’s challenge to the 
treatment of detainees at Guantánamo. Congress’s actions on that subject 
make clear that had Guantánamo been left to the majoritarian political 
process, there would have been few if any advances. The litigation 
generated and concentrated pressure on claims for a restoration of the 
values of legality, and, as discussed above, that pressure then played a 
critical role in the litigation’s outcome, which in turn contributed to a 
broader impetus for reform. 
The separation of powers and human rights are designed to discipline 
and constrain politics, out of a concern that majoritarian politics, focused 
on the short term, is likely to discount these long-term values. Yet 
without a critical mass of active support for constitutional principles, 
they are unlikely to be effective. The critical mass, however, need not be 
a majority. In the wake of 9/11, civil society organizations helped 
achieve results that almost certainly would have been impossible through 
a strictly majoritarian political process. The answer, then, is not to 
abandon legal for political constraints, as Posner and Vermeule would, 
but to promote a culture that values constitutional and human rights as 
legal constraints. 
Civil society organizations devoted to such values, such as Human 
Rights Watch, the Center for Constitutional Rights, and the American 
Civil Liberties Union, play a central role in facilitating, informing, and 
generating a culture of respect for liberty and legality.306
As distinct from ordinary politics, which tend to focus on the 
preferences of the moment, these civil society organizations are 
 Unlike 
governmental institutions, civil society groups have no formal authority 
to impose the limits of law themselves. Their recourse to the law is 
necessarily indirect: they can file lawsuits seeking judicial enforcement, 
lobby Congress for statutory reform or other legislative responses, or 
seek to influence the executive branch. But while they advance legal 
claims, they simultaneously pursue these goals through discursive means 
peculiar to civil society—by appealing to the public and elite opinion, 
through public advocacy, education, demonstrations, email and petition 
campaigns, and the like. 
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dedicated to a set of long-term commitments. Much like a constitution 
itself, civil society groups organized to promote constitutional and 
human rights are institutionally designed to emphasize and reinforce our 
long-term commitments to rights. When the ordinary political process is 
consumed by the heat of a crisis, organizations like the ACLU, Human 
Rights First, and the Center for Constitutional Rights, dedicated to 
preserving constitutional and human rights, can generally be counted on 
to stand up for these rights and to resist political pressures. At their best, 
civil society organizations help forge a culture of resilience about rights. 
Kramer, Tushnet, Post and Siegel, Posner and Vermeule, and 
Margulies and Metcalf all recognize the importance of culture as a 
checking force on government power in the modern world.307
B. Law: The Checking Function of Political Freedom  
 But none 
focuses on the particular role that civil society organizations committed 
to constitutional and human rights play in that checking mechanism. It is 
not that the “rule of politics” has replaced the “rule of law,” as Posner 
and Vermeule would have it, or that the Constitution needs to be taken 
from the courts and given to the people, as the popular constitutionalists 
advocate, but that a culture of resilience about rights, reinforced by civil 
society, is an essential element in ensuring that constitutional law is more 
than mere words.  
If a robust civil society is essential to healthy constitutionalism, then 
constitutional protections of civil society, in particular the First 
Amendment, may be as important as the formal separation of powers. In 
this sense, the post-September-11 decade can be read as a vindication of 
Vincent Blasi’s classic vision of the First Amendment’s “checking 
value.”308 Blasi argued that one of the central values of free speech is 
precisely its instrumental ability to hold official power in check by 
calling it to public account.309 But of course it is not the First 
Amendment itself that calls power to account. The First Amendment 
creates a safe space for civil society to act, but it is civil society itself that 
is the living embodiment of this “checking value.”310
The First Amendment is the lifeblood of civil society. For civil 
society organizations to flourish, they must have the freedom to criticize 
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the government; to organize themselves as associations; to appeal to the 
citizenry for support, both financial and ideological; and to collaborate 
with other groups as a means of furthering their ends.311
In this light, three developments since September 11 should be of 
concern. First, while direct attacks on speech have not been a central 
feature of the “war on terror,” free speech remains vulnerable, especially 
for some. By and large, since 9/11, we have not seen the sort of direct 
punishment of speech that characterized the government’s response to 
anti-war activists during World War I or Communist sympathizers in the 
McCarthy era.
 Maintaining 
those freedoms is an important value in itself, but also has substantial 
instrumental benefits, inasmuch as a free civil society may act as a 
critical check on executive abuses of other rights. Accordingly, an 
appreciation of the role of civil society in making the Constitution work 
should underscore the central importance of preserving First Amendment 
protection for such organizations’ speech and associational activities. 
 312 However, the government’s aggressive targeting of 
Muslim communities in the United States, including the use of pretextual 
immigration charges, informants, and undercover provocateurs, has had a 
profound chilling effect on that community’s freedom to engage in 
criticism of the government.313 While this targeting does not directly 
affect the ability of non-Muslim and non-Arab individuals and 
organizations to criticize government overreaching, the Arab and Muslim 
community, as the target of virtually all of the overreaching, is the most 
important source of information.314 Immigrants are especially vulnerable 
because the byzantine immigration code affords wide discretion for 
selective enforcement and the Supreme Court has ruled that even 
selective enforcement based on otherwise protected associations is no bar 
to deportation proceedings.315
Second, Congress and the President have criminalized speech and 
association when engaged in with or on behalf of organizations that the 
government has designated as “terrorist”—regardless of the otherwise 
peaceful and lawful character of the individual’s speech or association. 
 While investigating potential terrorists is 
indisputably important, the heavy-handed way in which the federal 
government has gone about it has undermined the freedom of members 
of Arab and Muslim communities to speak out and be heard—and that in 
turn increases the likelihood of executive overreaching. 
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Federal law broadly empowers the executive to designate domestic as 
well as foreign groups as “terrorist,” and makes it a crime to provide 
such groups with any “material support,” or to engage in any 
“transaction” with them, including offering them any service.316 Both 
“material support” and “service” are defined sufficiently broadly as to 
include pure speech, and neither requires any nexus between the content 
of the speech and any terrorist conduct.317 Thus, these laws make it a 
crime to engage in speech advocating only human rights and the peaceful 
resolution of conflict, when done for or with designated groups.318 In 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Obama administration 
successfully established that speech advocating only “political ideas and 
lawful means of achieving political ends” could be made criminal 
without transgressing the First Amendment.319
For all practical purposes, these laws resurrect the principle of “guilt 
by association” that was so widely employed during the McCarthy era.
 
320 
As the McCarthy era waned, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
Constitution precludes the imposition of guilt for association with a 
proscribed group absent proof that an individual had the specific purpose 
of furthering its illegal ends.321 The “material support” law does not 
criminalize membership or association as such, but it effectively does 
just that by making it a crime to do anything that one would do as a 
member or associate of a group. Under current law, one has a 
constitutional right to be a member of a group the government has 
designated “terrorist,” but has no right to pay dues, volunteer services, or 
advocate even for peaceful, lawful reform on the group’s behalf.322
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“material support” laws have effectively rendered the right of association 
a meaningless formality. The fact that this restriction on political 
freedom is selectively targeted at groups officially disfavored by the 
government makes the law even more suspect from a First Amendment 
standpoint. The views of such groups, and of their supporters, could well 
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be particularly relevant from a checking standpoint, as they are most 
likely to be the victims of the government’s overreaching. The “material 
support” law’s sweeping criminalization of virtually any speech or 
associational activity in coordination with officially disfavored groups 
has its most chilling effects on those groups and individuals from whom 
we most need to hear. 
Third, and more generally, the doctrinal approach the Supreme Court 
employed in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Court’s first post-
9/11 case pitting free speech and association against national security 
claims, appears to dilute substantially constitutional protection for 
precisely the speech that is most important to checking government 
abuse in this sphere. The Court in Humanitarian Law Project 
acknowledged that, as applied to plaintiffs’ speech advocating human 
rights and peace, the “material support” ban was a content-based 
prohibition triggering the First Amendment’s heightened scrutiny.323 
Exceedingly few laws survive such scrutiny, which ordinarily requires 
the government to establish that prohibiting the specific speech at issue is 
necessary to further a compelling state interest.324 The government must 
substantiate its assertions with evidence, and show that there are no more 
narrowly tailored means to achieve its ends.325 Yet in Humanitarian Law 
Project, the Court hypothesized justifications for the statute that the 
government itself had never even advanced, and then upheld the statute 
on that basis without any evidence to substantiate its speculations.326 
Thus, it reasoned that teaching a group how to advocate for human rights 
might permit it to engage in harassment by filing such claims; that 
advising a group on paths toward peace might allow the group to use 
peace negotiations as a cover to re-arm itself; and that even if none of 
these immediate negative results arose, assisting the group in lawful 
activities might burnish its legitimacy, which it could then use to raise 
support for more terrorist activities.327 The Court never demanded any 
evidence that advocacy of peace and human rights had ever had such 
effects, or that criminalizing such speech was necessary or narrowly 
tailored to fight terrorism. Instead, the Court stressed that in the area of 
national security and foreign relations, it had to defer to the political 
branches.328
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 Yet as the government itself had not even advanced many of 
these purported justifications, the Court in essence deferred to its own 
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speculation. If such “deferential strict scrutiny” is to be the standard for 
judging future restrictions on speech defended in the name of national 
security or foreign relations, the First Amendment is unlikely to be much 
of a bulwark against censorship in times of crisis. 
The central checking role that First Amendment freedoms played in 
the restoration of the rule of law after September 11 should reinforce the 
importance of prohibiting “guilt by association,” whether it appears in 
the form of “material support” or a direct prohibition on membership. It 
should make us more sensitive to the chilling effects of overly aggressive 
targeting of the Muslim community. And it should lead the courts to 
adopt a more truly skeptical stance toward content-based restrictions on 
speech justified in the name of national security. The fact that civil 
society groups in the United States did feel free to criticize the 
government’s overreaching in the wake of September 11 indicates that 
the culture of political freedom here remains strong. But neither the 
political branches nor the judiciary have given sufficient emphasis to the 
importance of maintaining political freedom as a checking force in times 
of crisis. 
C. Practice: Civic Engagement 
Our survival as a constitutional democracy turns not only on a 
written constitution and the separation of powers, but on a vibrant civil 
society dedicated to reinforcing and defending constitutional values. 
Perhaps the most important implication of this observation is not 
theoretical or doctrinal, but practical. As citizens, it is our obligation to 
get engaged in the struggle for constitutional and human rights. Without 
such engagement, the Constitution is unlikely to fulfill its promise. In a 
sense, the Constitution is not “self-executing.” It can, of course, be 
invoked directly in court without congressional adoption. But in a more 
fundamental sense, the sense referred to by Learned Hand, there will not 
be much left to invoke unless there is a culture of respect for 
constitutional principles. And that culture is of our own making. It 
cannot be “guaranteed” by a document, nor by the commitments of 
framers long dead, nor by the formal separation of powers, but only by 
the active civic engagement of human beings. 
We typically think of civic obligations as consisting of quasi-official 
actions directly related to governance: voting, serving on juries, paying 
taxes, and in extreme situations, serving in the military. More broadly 
speaking, an ethic of volunteering and civic engagement celebrates 
involvement in parent-teacher associations, neighborhood groups, 
religious communities, and charitable organizations. As Robert Putnam 
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and others have shown, all such engagement is important to the vibrancy 
and health of a society.329
But the engagement that “civil society constitutionalism” identifies 
as essential has a more particular focus, on constitutionalism itself. 
Groups like the ACLU, the Center for Constitutional Rights, and the Bill 
of Rights Defense Committee are defined by their commitment to such 
rights. But they are only the most obvious opportunities for engagement. 
Civil society offers a broad range of ways in which individuals may 
become involved in constitutional discourse—by attending lectures or 
demonstrations; participating in ad hoc groups focused on issues of 
rights; writing letters to the editor, blogs, or op-eds; teaching one’s 
children; or debating with one’s neighbors. There are an almost infinite 
variety of ways to engage with constitutionalism. But organized 
collective endeavors, with existing rights groups or through the creation 
of new ones, are probably the most effective. Joining a group defined by 
its commitment to constitutional and human rights is itself a check on 
one’s own temptations to short-circuit rights, or to waver in one’s 
attention or commitment to rights. The collective not only magnifies the 
impact that an individual might have, but also helps to hold individuals 
to their commitments. Thus, “civil society constitutionalism” is not just a 
direction for scholarship, or a justification for constitutional doctrine, but 
a pragmatic directive to citizens: get involved in the defense of your 
Constitution, or you may find it wanting when it is needed most.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Learned Hand’s assertion that as long as “liberty lies in the hearts of 
men and women . . . it needs no constitution, no law, no court to save it,” 
simultaneously captures an essential truth and overstates its case.330
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 It is 
true that without a culture that values constitutional rights, formal legal 
protections are likely to be largely unavailing. But it is not quite true that 
when such a culture exists, “it needs no constitution, no law, no court to 
save it.” The Constitution and the courts play a critical role in 
inculcating, reinforcing, and implementing the culture of the rule of law. 
They remind us of the values we hold in highest esteem. Court cases can 
serve as focal points for debating the application of these enduring 
constitutional values to current conditions. And courts can and often do 
enforce constitutional rights where the political branches would not. 
 330. Learned Hand, supra note 13. 
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Left out of Judge Hand’s equation altogether, however, and largely 
ignored by constitutional theorists before and since, is the role of civil 
society. Like government officials, the people at large will often fall 
short of constitutional ideals; that is one of the principal reasons that we 
have a Constitution in the first place. But, as the decade since September 
11 suggests, civil society organizations dedicated to defending 
constitutional rights can play a critical role in checking abuse, 
reinforcing and developing constitutional meaning, and ensuring that 
“liberty lies in the hearts of men and women.” Where the executive, the 
legislature, and the judiciary often compromised rights after September 
11, civil society organizations stood up to defend those rights. They 
helped to inculcate and reinforce a culture of legality, and provided a 
critically important voice for rule-of-law values. Absent that voice, it is 
far from clear that legality would have been restored to the extent that it 
was, or that the Supreme Court’s opinions in the military detention and 
trial cases would have been as strong as they were. Liberty must lie in 
the hearts of the people, but civil society can play an especially important 
part in keeping it alive there. In the end, Hand is correct that the 
responsibility lies with us, but an important mechanism for fulfilling that 
responsibility is political association, or civil society, in defense of 
constitutional rights. The past decade suggests that a political culture 
attuned to the values of constitutional and human rights, fostered by a 
robust civil society, can effectively check official abuse, even of the most 
powerful government in the world. 
 
